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 1. Introduction 
“Called ‘Myanmar’ by the ruling military junta and ‘Burma’ by 
opposition leaders who contest the current seated government, the former 
British colony of Burma/Myanmar has transformed itself from the most 
promising of post-colonial countries to a nation notorious for human 
rights violations and declining health and education standards. 
Like many countries emerging from colonial rule, the post-independence 
era in Burma has been characterized by conflict, corruption, and the 
existence of numerous groups contesting the government’s legitimacy. In 
addition, Burma’s leaders share with other autocratic regimes systematic 
and institutionalized methods for obtaining and maintaining power, such 
as a government-controlled media, patronage, and control of supposedly 
independent civil society groups. It is not surprising that the country’s 
current state of crisis and contestation has made it a notable source of 
refugees, many of whom flee to Thailand, though others to China, India, 
and Bangladesh.”  
(Banki, 2009: 48) 
For almost half a century the Burmese military regime has remained in power through 
forceful prevention of democratic change and by subjecting the country’s numerous 
ethnic minorities to crimes of genocide. Economic mismanagement, oppression of 
civil society, ongoing armed conflict, displacement, human rights abuses, poor 
governance and the lack of humanitarian access have resulted in one of the most 
intractable humanitarian crises, making Burma one of the poorest countries in the 
world. The humanitarian situation is characterised by severe poverty, serious health 
threats (e.g. HIV/AIDS, landmines etc.), low educational standards, food insecurity 
and displacement. With the root cause of that suffering being military misrule, 
Burma’s humanitarian crisis is entirely manmade (Beyrer et al., 2003: 1466).  
The regime’s contested legitimacy and low international acceptance poses the 
question of how to tackle the country’s humanitarian problems without strengthening 
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the current power holders to the international community. Confronted with numerous 
challenges typical for humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies, the aid 
community specifically struggles with the difficulty of maintaining humanitarian 
space in Burma. Humanitarian space is, however, not only restricted through 
constraints by the regime fearing popular unrest and foreign influence, but also 
through efforts of the U.S. Congress and pro-democracy activists overseas rejecting 
the provision of aid to Burma.  
Yet, accounts on humanitarian assistance to Burma usually focus on its restrictive 
operating environment, without taking into account the various successful efforts of 
Burmese civil society in-country and cross-border to relieve the suffering of their own 
people despite government repression. One of these efforts takes the form of cross-
border aid from neighbouring countries, supported by international aid agencies. 
Another example, is the innovative self-help initiatives and community-based 
organisations of civil society actors in-country. This paper will attempt to address 
both, the restriction and the construction of humanitarian space in Burma in order to 
give a holistic account of the situation.  
This is also a matter of personal concern to me as I am voluntarily active in the 
Austrian non-profit association ‚Burmahilfe – Bildung für bedrohte Minderheiten’ 
(‚Burma-relief – education for threatened minorities’) since its foundation in 2006. 
‚Burmahilfe’ operates in Vienna through fundraising and awareness-raising activities 
as well as in Mae Hong Son, Thailand, where it collaborates directly with Karenni 
(ethnic group of Burma) civil society organisations and supports a variety of their 
projects in the refugee areas in Northern Thailand as well as cross-border aid projects 
into the war zones of Karenni State. Therefore I not only want to highlight the 
political and humanitarian grievances in Burma and the special challenges faced by 
the international aid community in connection with it, but also the courage and power 
– though strictly limited -  of Burmese civil society actors, who provide relief under 
highly dangerous conditions. Moreover, this has been sparsely studied so far and is 
thus an important contribution to the emerging field of Anthropology of 
Humanitarianism.  
Currently, numerous politcal changes are taking place in Burma, especially since the 
elections in November 2010, which – according to the military regime – will finally 
lead to a democratic government. It was impossible to take all of these constant 
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changes happening while writing my thesis into account, so this paper only covers the 
political developments until the end of 2010. Against the backdrop of Burma’s recent 
history, however, I argue that this allegedly transitional process towards democracy 
merely covers up the predominant role of the military and is yet another attempt to 
fool the international community. So far, there have been no major changes in the 
power relations at all; quite the contrary, the military is further consolidating its 
power. Hence these recent events do not change the general conditions for my 
research question.              
Research Question and Methods 
My involvement in the non-profit association mentioned above raised my 
epistemological interest in the following aspects: What are the basic conditions for aid 
agencies working in complex emergencies such as Burma? What are the 
characteristics of complex emergencies and the related challenges that arise for the 
aid community? And how do these influence the extent and quality of humanitarian 
space? How is the work of aid organisations hampered in the specific Burmese 
context? How and by whom is aid still successfully provided? How are government 
restrictions circumvented? And which problems and dangers are connected with it? 
How much room is left for the aid community operating in Burma to manoeuvre? 
And what role does civil society play in it? 
These aspects resulted in the following research question for my thesis: How is the 
humanitarian space in Burma restricted on the one hand and created on the other 
hand? 
In order to answer this question I mainly draw on profound literature research at the 
University of Melbourne (during my study abroad semester) and in Vienna. In 
addition, I could revert to my experiences collected through my activity in the non-
profit association ‘Burmahilfe’, through numerous informal talks with the founder and 
chair-woman Gabriele Schaumberger, an expert on Burma, as well as through my trip 
to Mae Hong Son, Thailand, in 2008 where partners of ‘Burmahilfe’ and David 
Kniesz of ‘Partnering Ministries Worldwide‘ (PMW), a non-profit organization 
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providing emergency relief and education to people suffering from ethnic and 
religious cleansing throughout the Asian Continent, introduced me to the situation on 
site. For the project case study ‘Mobile Clinics’ in the fourth chapter I used 
unpublished reports written by Gabriele Schaumberger for ‘Caritas Austria’.  
Thesis Outline 
The thesis is composed of three main chapters. In the first part I will give an overview 
of the general conditions of humanitarian aid in complex emergencies in order to 
enable a deeper understanding of the complexity of such situations. In addition, the 
factors identified in this chapter also influence the extent and quality of humanitarian 
space and thus have to be taken into account. I will look at some of the characteristics 
of such complex emergencies in more detail and then give a brief introduction to 
humanitarian law, principles and standards. The chapter will also present the different 
actors of the humanitarian field and describe the characteristics and challenges of 
humanitarian aid in conflicts. Then I will move on to explore the necessary skills of 
humanitarian staff, local participation and aid worker security. Finally, I will give a 
condensed insight into the topic of evaluation. The last section will underline some of 
the main dilemmas, problems and challenges of providing assistance in complex 
emergencies.  
Before looking at the restriction and creation of humanitarian space in Burma, it is 
necessary to provide some background information on the country. This will be dealt 
with in the second chapter, including basic facts, historical and political background 
as well as the realms of foreign relations, ethnicity, the economy, social issues and the 
human rights situation. 
Finally, the third chapter explores the key challenge in the Burmese context, namely 
the difficulty of maintaining humanitarian space. Before exploring how humanitarian 
space is restricted and created, I give a brief overview of current humanitarian 
assistance to the country.  
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In Burma, the space for humanitarian action is being threatened by increasing 
violence against humanitarian aid workers and increasingly hostile state regulations of 
the work of aid agencies (Addison, 2008: 69). However, foreign aid is not only 
obstructed by constraints caused by the regime but also by pro-democracy activists 
overseas. Thus, in this chapter I will look at how these two factors restrict 
humanitarian space in Burma. Yet, despite the restrictive aid environment, it is also 
possible to carve out humanitarian space. In Burma, the lack of access to vulnerable 
populations has led to the development of cross-border aid through networks of local 
staff, agents and partner organisations (Addison, 2008: 69). Also, there has been a 
quiet expansion of Burmese civil society at the local level (Dalpino, 2009: 3), which 
shows that civilians are not mere victims of the military regime but rather political 
actors who address the basic needs of their communities through a variety of 
institutions and self-help initiatives. In the second part of this chapter I will 
demonstrate how these two forms of assistance successfully create humanitarian 
space under authoritarian rule, including a case study of the Austrian non-profit 
association ‘Burmahilfe’ and one of its cross-border projects. 
The conclusion will summarise my main findings. 
Terminology and Definitions 
Humanitarian Space: 
Humanitarian Space refers to “the ability of international and local groups to 
provide assistance” (Dalpino, 2009: 3).  
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 
Forced migration takes the form of refugees and internal displacement. The 
1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN Commission on 
Human Rights) define IDPs as: “persons or groups of persons who have been 
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or 
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natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognized State border” (in South, 2008b: 78).  
Civil Society: 
In order to define civil society under authoritarian rule it is more fruitful to use 
a relational approach that takes into account the political and cultural context 
civil society actors operate in and the scope of action, which is conceded to or 
gained by them. In this sense Kocka et al. define civil society as a specific 
type of action and interaction “characterised by self-organisation and self-
reliance, by their operating in the public sphere, by using discourse as a means 
of resolving conflicts, by tolerance of heterogeneity and pluralism, by their 
differing from violence and war and by their pursuit of the collective good.” 
Thus this focus of analysis shifts to research on the degree to which certain 
organisations are more or less civil society-like (in Lorch, 2006: 8-9).  
Humanitarian Assistance: 
I use the term ‘humanitarian assistance’ as defined by Burkle: “Humanitarian 
assistance is the aid to an affected population, which serves as its primary 
purpose to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population.” It 
is provided under mandates of the international humanitarian law and in 
accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, 
independence and neutrality (2006: 110).  
Burma or Myanmar?  
Like the opposition and several Western countries I use the name ‘Burma’ 
rather than the official name ‘Myanmar’, which reflects the political sensitive 
choice of refusing to recognise the name changes instigated by the illegitimate 
junta in 1989. Also most Burmese people still use the old name in private 
conversations. Likewise I use ‘Rangoon’ instead of ‘Yangon’ and ‘Irrawaddy’ 
instead of ‘Ayeyarwady’. The term ‘Burmese’ is used for any person 
originally coming from Burma, while ‘Burman’ is used for people from the 
ethnic majority group.  
 21 
2. Humanitarian Aid in Complex Emergencies  
Before looking at the restriction and construction of humanitarian space in Burma, it 
is necessary to give a brief overview of the general conditions of humanitarian aid in 
complex emergencies in order to enable a deeper understanding of the complexity of 
such situations and a classification of the Burmese case. In addition, the factors 
identified in this chapter also influence the extent and quality of humanitarian space 
and thus have to be taken into account.  
Since the end of the Cold War the need for humanitarian aid operations has grown 
together with the dramatically increasing and ever more complex emergencies. After 
1988 regional, ethnic and intrastate animosities, which had been repressed by Cold 
War interests, overflow across Asia, the Balkans and Africa (Smillie and Minear, 
2004: 9-10). These so-called ‘new conflicts’ are mainly characterised by political 
instability and armed conflict, and thus challenge the humanitarian community in 
specific ways. This chapter will look at some of the characteristics of such complex 
emergencies in more detail and then move on to give a brief introduction to 
humanitarian law, principles and standards. It will also present the different actors of 
the humanitarian field and describe the characteristics and challenges of humanitarian 
aid in conflicts. Then I will move on to explore the necessary skills of humanitarian 
staff, local participation and aid worker security. Finally I will give a brief insight into 
the topic of evaluation. The last chapter will underline some of the main dilemmas, 
problems and challenges. 
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What is a complex emergency? 
The term ‘complex emergency’ was coined in the Mozambican context of the late 
1980s. Since the international community was more directly involved in humanitarian 
assistance after the Cold War, the term is being used for situations where chronic 
armed conflict and political instability are the principal causes of humanitarian needs 
in comparison to natural disasters. Even though the term is potentially confusing by 
implying that natural disasters and conflict-related emergencies prior to the 1980s 
were not complex, it does highlight the fact that situations involving political 
instability and armed conflict are often particularly complex and as such confront aid 
providers with significant challenges (OECD, 1999b: 4-5).  
The United Nations (UN) define a complex emergency (CE) “as a humanitarian crisis 
in a country, region, or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of 
authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or 
ongoing UN country program” (Burkle, 2006: 110). However, the UN and other 
multilateral organisations are not engaged in some major CEs, e.g. Burma or Algeria 
(Sue et al., 2004: 2134).  
From an anthropological viewpoint, humanitarian crises represent “radical disruptions 
that challenge the existing social and cultural orders, including those of the helpers.” 
They “tear apart the invisible social fabric which surrounds the victims and gives 
meaning to their lives” and thus suffering is not only physical but also caused by this 
dismantling of the social and cultural world. The struggle for survival is therefore 
accompanied by the struggle of rebuilding this social fabric. It is crucial to take this 
into account in order to avoid dangerous simplifications that often resulted in the 
failure and unnatural effects of aid programs. In humanitarian emergencies different 
cultures are forced to interact, which brings the anthropological perspective into the 
picture. Different cultural perspectives entail “a series of problems concerning daily 
communication, most notably on the level of language and the shared assumptions 
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underlying social behaviour in different cultural contexts (Network on Humanitarian 
Assistance (NOHA), 1998: 1-2).  
Even though each emergency is unique in its origins and characteristics, it is helpful 
to look at some key characteristics of CEs and the international system for responding 
to them, identified by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, 
and which are all important in the Burmese context: 
• Intra-State rather than Inter-State Conflict 
Nowadays most conflicts are intra-state (also termed civil wars) rather than 
inter-state and stem from disaffection by part of the population with the 
existing governance and authority structures. As a consequence, opposition or 
‘rebel’ groups aim at overthrowing the government or at secession from the 
country, as in Burma some ethnic minorities do. The degree of recognition or 
status given to these groups by the international community is often a very 
sensitive issue with important implications for the humanitarian work. 
• Difficulty in Differentiating Combatants and Civilians 
In many conflict situations it is difficult to distinguish between civilians and 
combatants, e.g. when uniforms are not worn. This intermingling is often a 
deliberate policy. Thus humanitarian agencies are unable to prevent assistance 
such as food being used by combatants and warring factions either through 
coercion or on a voluntary basis of the civil population.  
• Violence Directed Towards Civilians and Civil Structures 
The victims of violence are mainly civilians - Burkle estimates 50-90 % 
(2006: 110). They are deliberately attacked and deprived of their livelihood in 
order to displace certain social or ethnic groups or even to eliminate them, e.g. 
Burma’s minorities are subjected to genocide by the military. Besides more 
usual attacks on economic infrastructure (public buildings, roads etc.), 
communities are attacked with the objective of causing fear and flight. The 
perpetrators can then use the abandoned territory, farmland and housing. In 
addition, attacks may also be carried out on targets that play a special role in 
the cultural identity of a group (e.g. religious places).  
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• Fluidity of the Situation on the Ground 
CEs are often chronic situations lasting several years on the one hand, and 
highly fluid in particular geographical areas at particular times on the other 
hand. Fighting produces civilian and military casualties and fleeing population 
groups create more or less localised displacement crisis. Thus chronic 
problems are frequently interspersed with situations requiring urgent 
responses by relief agencies.  
• Lack or Absence of Normal Accountability Mechanisms 
In most CEs the functionality and freedom of press and judiciary are either 
constrained or have been eliminated, creating a context of absent or severely 
weakened national accountability mechanisms.  
• The Potential and Actual Development of War Economies 
The absence of authorities can lead to the development of illegal or semi-legal 
economic activities such as the exploitation of natural resources, money 
laundering and trading in narcotics and arms, which is a big problem in 
Burma. These activities are often controlled or taxed by leaders of the warring 
factions who use the profit for personal gain or to prosecute the conflict. These 
war economies not only prolong the conflict but also provide an incentive to 
the conflict and its prolongation.  
• The Potential for Humanitarian Assistance to Prolong the Conflict 
Humanitarian assistance holds the potential of abuse by being ‘diverted’ from 
the intended beneficiaries and controlled and taxed like war economy 
activities, thus providing warring factions, or in the case of Burma the regime, 
with additional resources. Reliable empirical evidence of abuse in order to 
understand the impact of humanitarian assistance is often lacking though. 
• A Multiplicity of Actors 
The international system for responding to CEs involves a wide range of 
actors and is thus highly complex. As authority structures are generally weak 
or absent, coordination becomes a major challenge and is an ongoing issue of 
 25 
debate. Also the multiplicity of actors involved in the response or with an 
interest in the outcome of the conflict guarantees different goals, which may 
even be at odds with each other.  
(OECD, 1999b: 6-9) 
In addition I would like to highlight a few more important characteristics of CEs. 
They involve an intricate web of political, economic, military, and social forces 
engaged in violence. Also, they are frequently accompanied by public health threats, 
natural disasters (e.g. Cyclone Nargis in Burma), environmental issues, and socio-
political processes (e.g. globalisation). It is important to note, that CEs involve both 
the random and the deliberate creation of crises, which makes them more devastating 
in human terms than natural disasters. Additionally warring parties sometimes deny 
civilians access to essential relief services, which can be attended by violence and 
serious effects on the security of aid workers (Sue et al., 2004: 2134, 2139). Also 
countries of violent conflict are often characterized by a lack of state capacity, 
legitimacy and accountability as well as by a gross imbalance in military expenditure 
(Manning and Trzeciak-Duval, 2010: 104, 119). Schneider-Enk mentions some more 
features of contemporary conflicts such as massive violations of humanitarian law and 
human rights, a high diversity and degree of violence, high numbers of refugees and 
displaced persons and the longevity of the emergency situation (Schneider-Enk, 2008: 
62). All these characteristics form the basic conditions for humanitarian assistance to 
Burma.  
Humanitarian Law, Principles and Standards 
Humanitarian assistance is based on the norms and standards codified in international 
humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law and refugee law. These define the rights 
and duties of civilians, combatants and humanitarian actors. In situations of armed 
conflict civilians have the right to international protection and assistance when their 
national authorities have not met these. Although the mandates and access specified 
are neither ensured, nor enforced, they provide a set of norms and expectations for 
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measuring the behaviour of civilians, combatants and humanitarian actors (Smillie 
and Minear, 2004: 12).  
The Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention sets down the minimum rights for 
civilians in non-international conflicts. They should be treated humanely and 
protected from any kind of violence and outrages to personal dignity, thus making the 
right to protection universal and absolute. The Conventions’ Second Protocol of 1977 
ads specific prohibitions concerning rape, acts or threats of violence in order to spread 
terror, deliberate starvation and the destruction of food, agricultural areas, crops, 
livestock and water supplies. Bryer and Cairns emphasize that “on these points, both 
the individual’s right to protection and the combatant’s obligation not to violate it are 
equally absolute” (1997: 356). The Second Protocol covers all civilians who are not 
participating directly in hostilities, which is usually the great majority, and thus draws 
a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The rights that can be 
claimed under IHL cover both, protection from violence and humanitarian assistance. 
Many NGOs have long recognized that aid alone is not enough. However, strategies 
to provide assistance may undermine strategies for protection, therefore presenting 
painful choices between the two (ibid.: 356).  
Bryer and Cairns identify the disregard of combatants and the international 
community for much of the applicable international law as the key reason for the 
difficulties faced in providing humanitarian aid. Also they stress, that aid agencies 
have no responsibility to provide aid where the net impact is negative (due to the 
various side effects of their interventions), or to those who violate international law. 
Instead they should campaign for governments to act if these fail in their 
responsibilities to protect civilians (ibid.: 363-4).  
In conclusion it can be said that, even though humanitarian action is usually viewed as 
an optional, voluntary undertaking, it actually is a rights-based activity integral to a 
civilized, law-abiding, and peaceful world (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 3).  
This body of law and practice is bounded by the fundamental humanitarian principles 
of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality: 
• The principle of humanity or the humanitarian imperative bases the necessity 
to act on the right of all humans to aid and protection and exclusively on 
behalf of humanity. This acknowledgement of a fundamental right to 
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assistance clearly differs from a charitable motivation of altruism. Rather than 
being an act of generosity, humanitarian action reacts to urgent needs of basic 
services.  
• The principle of impartiality indicates, that assistance and protection has to 
be granted to all concerned parties, uninfluenced of their political, religious or 
ethnic affiliation. The assistance is strictly and solely geared by the impartial 
assessment of need. 
• The principle of independence presumes that humanitarian agencies act 
independently of political and other connections as well as interests, which 
would affect their impartiality.  
• The principle of neutrality signifies that aid workers have to refrain from the 
political interests in a conflict. However, neutrality does not mean to keep 
silent about massive violations of international law and crimes against 
humanity. 
(Kampmüller, 2003: 148) 
Aid agencies have to rely on their reputation of being impartial, independent and 
neutral in order to be able to distribute humanitarian aid. If the warring parties regard 
humanitarian operations as being of assistance to the enemy, the principles are 
abandoned, which can have serious effects on humanitarian space and aid worker 
security. This can be especially problematic in aid operations with military 
participation, e.g. UN peace-enforcement or peacekeeping operations (Goller, 2002: 
16).  
Yet these essential humanitarian principles have been increasingly tested by an ever 
more complex and competitive aid environment and remain a controversial issue 
(Kent, 2003: 439).  
The increasing professionalization of humanitarian aid is apparent in the formulation 
of standards in order to guide the international community’s response mechanisms. 
‘The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Relief’ is the pioneer of humanitarian codes. It was developed 
and agreed upon by eight of the world's largest aid agencies in 1994. The Code of 
Conduct is voluntary and lays down ten points of principle as well as guidelines, 
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which describe the relationships that agencies should seek with donor governments, 
host governments and the UN system. It seeks to maintain the high standards of 
independence, effectiveness and impact (International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies, 2005a). As of 2010, 458 organizations have signed the code 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005b).  
The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief:  
1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. 
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse 
distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. 
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 
4. We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.  
5. We shall respect culture and custom. 
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. 
7. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. 
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meet basic needs. 
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we 
accept resources. 
10. In our information, publicity and advertizing activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as 
dignified human beings, not hopeless objects. 
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2005a) 
 
From this Code of Conduct other initiatives have followed, e.g. the ‘SPHERE 
Project’, a program that was launched in 1997 by the ‘Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian Response’ (SCHR) and ‘InterAction’ in order to develop a set of 
universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance. The objective 
of the project is not only to improve the quality of aid but also to enhance the 
accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response (The Sphere Project, 
2004).  
An initiative of more recent origin are ‘The Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ – or ‘Fragile States Principles’ (FSPs) 
that were first adopted by OECD ministers in 2007. They provide a set of guidelines 
for actors involved in development co-operation, peacebuilding, statebuilding and 
security in fragile and conflict-affected states (OECD, 2010).  
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The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and 
Situations: 
1. Take context as the starting point 
2. Ensure all activities do no harm 
3. Focus on state building as the central objective 
4. Prioritize prevention 
5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives 
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies 
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts 
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors 
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance 
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”) 
(OECD, 2010) 
 
In an attempt to overcome the challenges faced by aid agencies in the delivery of aid 
in Burma, a group of INGOs developed “Joint Principles of Operation of International 
Non-Governmental Organizations Providing Humanitarian Assistance in 
Burma/Myanmar”, distributed in June 2000 (Burma UN Service Office, 2003: 18).  
Humanitarian Actors 
I already addressed the multiplicity and diversity of players in the humanitarian field 
and the challenge of coordination and cooperation (see figure 2). All actors embrace 
humanitarian principles, however, there are many different understandings of those as 
well as different motifs and self-interests. Especially governments’ charitable 
contributions are complex and calculating as they are intruded by a variety of political 
and diplomatic, economic and commercial, institutional and organizational factors. 
Humanitarianism has become a big business and competition in the aid marketplace 
has increased drastically. At the same time the wishes and capacities of the local 
population and their institutions are frequently not comprised in the humanitarian 
initiative, even though they carry out most of the humanitarian aid in a crisis and offer 
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the best long-term potential for prevention (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 8-9). All these 
factors significantly weaken aid and development effectiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Actors and Resource Flows within the International Relief System1 
Smillie and Minear identify six sets of humanitarian actors: 
• The United Nations institutions developed over a period of years and mirror 
a trend toward greater specialization and division of labor within the 
humanitarian enterprise. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the UN humanitarian response.  
• Donor governments and their various bilateral aid agencies, e.g. the 
Austrian Development Agency (ADA), make up a second cluster of actors. 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) represents the traditional 
‘donors’ club’ of some 22 members. In 2009 the International Network on 
Fragility and Conflict (INCAF) was founded as a subsidiary body of the DAC 
in order to help improve international responses to the most challenging 
development settings and to chart results (OECD, 2010). Donor countries 
usually have their own bilateral aid programs but mostly seek out operational 
                                                
1  OECD 1999a. Actors and Resource Flows within the International Relief System. Paris. 
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partners in the form of UN agencies or international NGOs. In 1992 European 
governments sought to orchestrate their crises response with the formation of 
the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). In recent years many 
Asian countries have joined the donor community. Unfortunately donor 
countries tend to provide what they have in excess rather than what the 
beneficiaries require or need. Food assistance for instance has serious impacts 
on domestic markets.  
• Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) are defined as voluntary, 
independent and not-for-profit (Burkle, 2006: 113). Many international 
NGOs have long histories and have their roots in religious and missionary 
undertakings, e.g. Save the Children or CARE. Still, this group of non-state 
actors has only recently gained significant importance – to the chagrin of some 
governments. They manage about 60 percent of all humanitarian funding and 
some of them have larger budgets than the respective government ministry. 
Also they provide more aid in more countries and carry more credibility with 
taxpayers. Many of the major NGOs have a consultative status at the UN 
family organizations, which gives them even more influence. Thus they are 
also taken with increasing seriousness by insurgent movements. Often NGOs 
organize themselves into issue-oriented networks – e.g. human rights groups – 
for advocacy and solidarity purposes. NGOs differ in size and sources of 
income as well as geographic and programmatic specializations. Some receive 
most of their income from the public, others from official agencies. Accepting 
official funding from governments or the UN has, however, pros and cons. 
Some argue that it gives NGOs more political influence while others worry 
that it may inhibit their independence and advocacy.  
• The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is one of the world’s major 
humanitarian players. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
was founded in 1863 and is based in Geneva. It is mentioned by name and 
function in international humanitarian law and “has a unique mandate to 
monitor the treatment of prisoners and to assist in finding, tracing, and 
protecting those missing because of conflict” (Burkle, 2006: 114). National 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 181 countries make it a truly global 
network, spanning donor and recipient countries. The International Federation 
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of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), founded in 1919, 
coordinates them.  
• Indigenous NGOs and civil society institutions are the most historically 
rooted and potentially most important but at the same time least appreciated 
humanitarian players. These local actors usually set the stage for humanitarian 
initiatives, which are predominantly an expatriate show with the lead roles 
played by outsiders. This missing participation leads to bitterness and 
grievances by host governments and local NGOs. In Burma this group of 
actors plays a particularly crucial role in self-help initiatives and in the 
implementation of aid projects, especially in cross-border aid. 
• In addition to these traditional actors Smillie and Minear mention a few 
newcomers in the humanitarian scene. One group consists of Muslim 
contributors, who make so far scarcely noticed significant donations in the 
form of religious duties. Furthermore a trend towards for-profit contractors 
and expanded roles of the military can be observed. This results for instance in 
the growing use of private security firms by the U.S. military. These actors are 
particularly suited to the post-Cold War scene: “Internal armed conflicts make 
humanitarian access more difficult for the traditional actors, placing a 
premium on security. The ideology of the marketplace […] seems like a 
natural for the more competitive world of social and economic reconstruction 
abroad” (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 18). Traditional actors feel threatened 
though, as military and for-profit contractors have a task-oriented mentality 
that may show results sooner. However, while their humanitarian 
contributions are sometimes indispensable, these newcomers are no substitute 
for the old.  
(Smillie and Minear, 2004: 11-18) 
Another increasingly important set of actors in intra-state conflicts are non-state 
armed groups (NSAGs), who are defined as groups who are armed, use force to 
achieve their objectives and are not under state control. Even though their sheer 
number and potential capacity to contribute enormously to prospective peace 
processes gives them great importance, they are not acknowledged as legitimate 
actors before international law and states are often unwilling to engage non-state 
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actors in dialogue. In this context independent NGOs have more freedom to engage 
NSAGs through methods of informal and unofficial diplomacy. This way they can 
supplement state approaches and as mediators facilitate contact between state actors 
and NSAGs. Hofmann concludes that these ‘small agreements’ in the humanitarian 
field can achieve enormous results and that this potential should not remain underused 
(Hofmann, 2006). Marriage emphasizes that non-state actors also play a vital role in 
the final delivery of aid (e.g. building wells, distributing food etc.): “Their 
inclinations, perceptions and collaboration with external parties become important in 
how and whether the aid is delivered appropriately” (Marriage, 2006: 8). In certain 
situations, like Burma, where government priorities are totally distorted or the state 
has failed, aid must be channeled through non-state vehicles (Manning and Trzeciak-
Duval, 2010: 105). Here NSAGs play an indispensable role in the delivery of aid in 
minority areas and especially in cross-border aid, as we will see in a later chapter.  
Finally, the most important actor in any emergency is the affected population itself. 
Here it is important to note, that individuals or segments of society are in different 
power positions and thus their vulnerability varies (Hagelüken, 1995: 31). The 
population should benefit from all aid efforts; however, they are often affected by the 
unintended negative consequences of aid. Seldom they are asked what kind of support 
they consider as necessary or how it should be delivered and thus aid is sometimes 
even enforced upon them (ibid.: 45). Experience has shown though, that these kinds 
of aid measures are not sustainable, because they are not adapted to the cultural needs 
and conditions. Participation should be the priority in all phases of an aid project, 
from planning to implementation and evaluation (ibid.: 55-56). It can take place 
through public or local authorities, local staff, indigenous partner organisations and 
civil society (ibid.: 59-64).  
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Characteristics of Humanitarian Aid in Conflicts 
Due to the characteristics of post-Cold War conflicts, the basic conditions for 
humanitarian interventions changed and as a result also the role and characteristics of 
humanitarian aid itself. Schneider-Enk mentions the following aspects: 
• As a result of the complexity of emergency situations, the number of actors 
increased dramatically. Many new NGOs developed with different self-images 
and also the UN adopted a bigger role.  
• Humanitarian funds increased enormously due to two reasons: on the one hand 
due to an increased demand because of the number and nature of the new 
conflicts; on the other hand is aid the preferred answer of the international 
community to conflicts.  
• Humanitarian actors compete for donors and as a result also for high visibility 
in the media.  
• As a consequence humanitarian actors work in the midst of conflict, often 
while hostilities take place. Especially NGOs work under highly dangerous 
conditions.  
• This requires extensive and sometimes very complicated negotiations about 
access to the affected population. Warring parties might make high demands, 
e.g. to be supplied with relief goods themselves. Sometimes NGOs work in 
conflict areas without an official permission by the government or with semi-
official permits of the local rulers respectively (e.g. cross-border aid into 
Burma).  
In many wars civilians are denied access to essential relief services, which can 
be accompanied by serious violence: “Within their national boundaries, these 
warring parties block relief convoys, obstruct ambulance passage, invade 
hospitals, destroy clinics, and harass and terrorise national and international 
medical and other humanitarian relief workers […]” (Sue et al., 2004: 2139). 
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In Burma the government itself blocks access to certain areas and population 
groups.  
• This increasingly dangerous work environment results in the growing 
assignment of private security companies (PSCs) in order to protect staff 
members. 
• As already mentioned the missing cooperation and coordination influences aid 
effectiveness and staff security. 
• As operations take place in the midst of conflict, the concept of humanitarian 
aid expanded to include not only emergency assistance but also protection of 
the civil population.  
• Another important aspect is the increasing politicisation and militarisation of 
aid. As the international community is reluctant to engage politically in 
conflicts, aid serves as a substitute for political actions. The military as new 
actor, especially on behalf of UN operations, not only fulfils the task of armed 
protection but also takes over affairs of humanitarian aid. This development 
leads to confusion concerning the character of aid and the roles of 
humanitarian actors. 
(Schneider-Enk, 2008: 52-58) 
Complex emergencies have several direct and indirect effects on health and health 
systems. Accordingly the principal resources provided are within the domain of 
public health (e.g. food, water, shelter, vaccination, primary health care). The long-
term needs, that are often covered post-conflict by development cooperation, concern 
security, environmental restoration (including de-mining), building or rebuilding 
physical infrastructure, and development of institutions and human capacities (Sue et 
al., 2004: 2138). The implementation of aid depends on the level of development, e.g. 
transport and communications links as well as the level of human capacity. In 
countries where infrastructure is less developed or has been destroyed, it is more 
difficult due to the lack of reliable supplies or physical access to parts of the country 
(Marriage, 2006: 9), which was for example a particular problem in the provision of 
aid after Cyclone Nargis.  
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In conclusion it is noteworthy that the priority of aid measures should be conflict-
prevention strategies, which could have avoided emergencies in some cases. 
Unfortunately these are not so popular as they do not fit into sensationalistic media 
(Hagelüken, 1995: 45).  
Humanitarian Staff 
Complex emergencies present aid workers with significant challenges and therefore 
require especially well-trained staff with a full understanding of the political, military, 
and economic dimensions of modern crisis. They are expected to have a wider range 
of skills including not only technical skills (e.g. public health), but also skills in the 
social sciences (e.g. human rights, anthropology) (Sue et al., 2004: 2135, 2137). The 
romantic idea about saving the world is replaced by highly experienced 
professionalism. The success of an aid operation depends to a great extent on the 
skills of the humanitarian staff. It has to be qualified, flexible and willing to cooperate 
with the local population and other organisations. Therefore the training of aid 
workers is of great significance. They should be instructed to the necessary skills, to 
humanitarian law, principles and codes, and especially to the local political and 
cultural context. Above all humanitarian staff has a highly important task: they are the 
diplomats in the field – a very heavy responsibility and burden (Goller, 2002: 19). In 
order to understand these challenges and experiences, Minear and Smith introduced 
the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, which encompasses “[…] the activities 
carried out by humanitarian organisations to obtain the space from political and 
military authorities within which to function with integrity. These activities comprise 
such efforts as arranging for the presence of international humanitarian organizations 
and personnel in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of 
assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programs, promoting respect for 
international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and 
engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives” 
(2007: 1). Most humanitarian workers negotiate in some way every day, but few have 
recognized this core activity as a conscious skill, that is transferable and needs to be 
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supported through increased investments in training personnel (ibid.). In Burma 
humanitarian diplomacy is a key skill for creating and maintaining humanitarian 
space.  
Unfortunately a broad and area-specific preparation of the staff often suffers due to 
the urgent need of action. Thus aid workers with prior experience in the respective 
country and with knowledge of the cultural circumstances are rare. Also a systematic 
follow-up of the experiences after the operation does usually not take place 
(Hagelüken, 1995: 43-44).  
Humanitarian staff consists of internal and external personnel, whose relationship is 
usually hierarchical. External aid workers have a very diverse occupational 
background, ranging from medical to financial staff. They are responsible to the 
respective aid organisation and mostly take over the project management. Indigenous 
staff can be divided into: 
• Support personnel (e.g. cleaners, guards, translators, drivers etc.) 
• Counterparts of the external personnel:  
These should cooperate closely with the foreign staff, advise them and help to 
initiate the projects. They are indispensable due to their local, cultural and 
linguistic knowledge. Mutual trust is desirable and beneficial, but as said the 
relationship is often characterised by hierarchy (ibid.: 43).  
Jobs in aid organisations are in great demand among the local population as they offer 
income and possibilities. However, it is very important to pay attention to a clan 
balance in order to avoid competition and feelings of discrimination. Furthermore the 
population sometimes pressures indigenous staff to misuse the position to their 
advantage (e.g. corruption, patronage) (ibid.: 61).  
Another form of cooperation is through an indigenous partner organisation. This 
allows greater closeness of the project to the local communities and an easier 
handover of the measures. Certainly it also bears the danger of cliquism (e.g. 
concerning the allocation of positions) and a misappropriation of project resources 
(ibid.: 61).  
As humanitarian organisations operate in increasingly hostile and militarized 
environments, staff faces physical and psychological strain as well as life-threatening 
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risks in their work. Even though the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention obligates 
warring parties to grant medical personnel and by extension all aid workers full and 
complete protection from interference or harm, this neutral status is increasingly put 
to the test in today’s conflicts (Sue et al., 2004: 2138). Schneider-Enk traces the 
lacking security of relief workers back to the characteristics of the new conflicts and 
of humanitarian aid. She specifies the following reasons: 
• As a result of the breakdown and degradation of government institutions, the 
states cannot attend to their duty of protecting humanitarian staff.  
• Also the warring parties are often not interested in protecting aid workers. For 
instance if their aim is the displacement or destruction of an ethnic group, the 
organisations who provide that group with relief are automatically seen as 
enemies and become a target of attacks. Moreover they want to get rid of 
potential witnesses of their war crimes by forcing aid agencies to withdraw 
through systematic attacks or by denying them an access authorisation. These 
are some of the reasons why the Burmese regime restricts access to minority 
areas.  
• Another reason for the increased number of victims among aid workers is the 
high proliferation of small arms. 
• The armed forces of a conflict often finance themselves through relief goods, 
but also the aid workers themselves are profitable targets for robbery (e.g. 
valuable equipment) and can serve the provision of foreign currency through 
racketeering and hostage taking. Also they fall victim to anti-civilian banditry. 
• The longevity of conflicts leads to a reduced perception of security risks by 
aid personnel. In addition it entails that aid supplies eliminate local markets 
and are incorporated into war economies, whereby staff becomes unpopular 
among local suppliers. 
• Another reason is the inexistent, late or egoistically coined willingness of the 
international community to intervene militarily in CEs. In multidimensional 
UN-operations the warring parties have a tendency of mixing up the roles and 
aims of aid organisations and the military. As a result of the increasing 
militarisation and politicisation of aid, humanitarian staff is not perceived as a 
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separate, impartial and neutral actor anymore. The situation is exacerbated by 
the political inactivity of the international community. 
• Schneider-Enk also mentions the lacking respect of international law, 
especially regarding the protection of civilians and non-combatants. Not even 
the protection symbol of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is met 
with befitting respect anymore. 
• Humanitarian aid often takes place in the midst of armed conflict, which has 
serious effects on the staff’s security. 
• Another risk comes along with the equation of humanitarian aid with Western 
values, which makes aid workers to ‘fair targets’ of attacks. In order to avoid 
identification the UN and ICRC sometimes renounce their emblems on the 
convoys. 
• Finally, aid organisations – mainly due to the pressure of the media, states and 
other donors - are not willing anymore to withdraw from dangerous areas. 
The fortune of aid workers and the civil population is closely connected. For both 
groups hardly any protect zones are left. The humanitarian space, where aid agencies 
can operate freely and safely, is strongly constricted or even missing. This reduces 
protection of the civil population as well as aid worker security (Schneider-Enk, 2008: 
62-71). 
Bollettino points out that the security situation is “exacerbated by the growing number 
of humanitarian organisations operating in the field, the diversity of their mandates, 
the lack of common professional security standards, and limited success in inter-
agency security coordination.” Still, many humanitarian agencies remain ambivalent 
about devoting increased resources to security management and coordination. He 
criticises the “absence of a systematic means of sharing incident data”, which 
undermines the capacity of the humanitarian community to address security threats 
(2008: 263).  
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Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex 
Emergencies 
Evaluation of humanitarian action is a key tool in efforts to improve its performance 
and professionalization, especially in terms of accountability and efficiency. In the 
past it “has been subjected to less rigorous and extensive monitoring and evaluation 
procedures than development aid”. As expenditures for humanitarian operations as 
well as awareness of its complexity have increased, the need for appropriate and 
consistent evaluation methodologies has become widely accepted (OECD, 1999b: 2). 
However, the humanitarian field is still characterised by weak monitoring and 
evaluation (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 19).  
The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action (ALNAP) defines the evaluation of humanitarian action as follows: 
“Evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA) is a systematic and impartial examination 
of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and 
enhance accountability. EHA: 
• Is commissioned by or in cooperation with the organisation(s) whose 
performance is being evaluated; 
• Is undertaken either by a team of non-employees (external) or by a mixed 
team of non-employees (external) and employees (internal) from the 
commissioning organisation and/or the organisation being evaluated; 
• Assesses policy and/or practice against recognised criteria (e.g. the DAC 
criteria); 
• Articulates findings, draws conclusions and makes recommendations.” 
(Beck, 2006: 14) 
It is important to take into account that the evaluation of humanitarian aid differs from 
conventional evaluation and has some distinct characteristics. In the case of CEs it is 
often undertaken during periods of prolonged severe disruption, which can have the 
following implications: 
 
• Polarised perspectives diminish the space for objective evaluation. 
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• Access to data, information and key informants may be more difficult, e.g. due 
to the high turnover of humanitarian staff. 
• Humanitarian action often has to be planned quickly and as a consequence 
objective statements and indicators may be missing from planning documents. 
• The disordered conditions of CEs lead to rapid change in circumstances, 
which makes it difficult to determine the context later (ibid.: 15).  
Thus, evaluators should make clear which constraints they faced and how they 
affected the process and findings (ibid.: 15). Moreover the OECD points out that the 
nature of CEs makes it specifically necessary to assess the humanitarian space, the 
security situation and the protection needs of the affected population (OECD, 1999b: 
11).  
In 1991 the OECD/DAC developed broad principles in order to facilitate the 
evaluation process. These were refined into five criteria, which today are regarded as 
standard evaluation criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and 
relevance. Subsequently they were adapted and expanded to seven criteria for the 
evaluation of CEs: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, relevance/appropriateness, 
connectedness, coherence and coverage (Beck, 2006: 10).  
• Efficiency: measures the qualitative and quantitative outputs in relation to the 
inputs. 
• Effectiveness: measures the extent to which the activity achieved its purpose. 
• Impact: examines the social, economic, technical and environmental effects 
of the project on individuals, gender and age groups, communities and 
institutions. Thus it is about the real difference for the beneficiaries.  
• Relevance/Appropriateness: relevance assesses whether the project is in line 
with local needs as well as with donor policy. Appropriateness is more 
focused on the activities and inputs and can be described as the need to tailor 
humanitarian activities to local needs. So the two criteria complement each 
other on the macro and micro level.  
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• Connectedness: is the counterpart to sustainability and refers to the need of 
emergency assistance to take longer-term and interconnected problems into 
account. 
• Coherence: postulates coherence of political, diplomatic, economic, military 
and humanitarian strategies and approaches as well as coordination of the 
humanitarian actors. 
• Coverage: aid should reach major population groups and provide them with 
assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of political 
agendas. It also assesses the differing impacts on different population groups. 
(OECD, 1999b: 22-23)  
Dilemmas, Problems and Challenges 
As we can see from the preceding chapters humanitarian assistance in CEs faces 
numerous dilemmas, problems and challenges.  
The most important issue is the question whether the abuse of aid and its various 
negative side effects, including the potential for aid to prolong the conflict through 
providing subsistence to warring parties and by facilitating the elimination of state 
responsibilities for social welfare functions, outweigh its benefits. Especially in armed 
conflicts, where its abuse has become a certainty, judging the ‘net impact’ of aid 
involves practical difficulties and ethical choices (Bryer and Cairns, 1997: 363). If the 
net impact is negative, agencies must consider withdrawing or reducing assistance 
(Lischer, 2005: 143). Mary B. Anderson has identified some ways in which aid can 
have negative and positive ‘by-products’ (Bryer and Cairns, 1997: 365) and 
encouraged the ‘do no harm’ approach as a principle of engagement (Sue et al., 2004: 
2137). In the Burmese context this resulted in an ongoing debate on engagement, 
which will be explained in the fourth chapter.  
Another highly controversial issue concerns the question of whether humanitarian 
organisations can and should be neutral. Lischer for example argues that it is 
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impossible for material assistance to have a neutral effect in a conflict as humanitarian 
work cannot be isolated from the political and military context (2005: 143). Bryer and 
Cairns underline that humanitarian principles do not mean that agencies can be 
neutral about whether atrocities are good or bad and consequently they should not be 
silent about war crimes (1997: 367). However, in some circumstances such advocacy 
may mean that the organisation cannot continue its programme due to security 
reasons. Here the agency has to judge whether their impact is higher by its continued 
presence or by speaking out (ibid.: 372). Kent points to the factor that a neutral and 
impartial humanitarian stance may be of questionable morality when the conflict is 
perpetuated without greater aid conditionality (2003: 440). Cross-border aid into 
Burma for instance heavily relies on support and protection by armed resistance 
groups, which challenges its neutrality. However, otherwise this much-needed 
assistance would not be possible.  
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that humanitarian organisations have to act in 
a ‘policy vacuum’, “in which aid policy becomes not a part of a coherent international 
response, but almost the entire response.” Aid policy increasingly becomes a 
substitute for foreign policy, especially in countries with little geo-economic 
significance (Bryer and Cairns, 1997: 370). This entails a dangerous overestimation of 
the capacities of humanitarian aid. In Burma the international response consists 
mainly of economic sanctions.  
Other noteworthy problems are the general decline in official development spending 
and the failure of governments to undertake a wide range of conflict-prevention 
policies (ibid.: 372).  Increased funding of prevention strategies would be much more 
efficient. 
As a result of the numerous dilemmas and problems, the humanitarian enterprise is 
characterised by a surprising degree of competition, mistrust and antipathy between 
the various humanitarian actors (Smillie and Minear, 2004: 19), e.g. in Burma 
between agencies working in-country and cross-border.  
At this point it is indispensable to note that the international community itself is 
jointly responsible for humanitarian emergencies as these often have their roots in 
international inequalities of power as well as international financial and trading 
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policies (ibid.: 20). Thus, making the economic order a little bit fairer could make a 
big difference. 
Finally, I find it very important to highlight again the significance of knowing and 
respecting the local socio-cultural context, of indigenous participation and of using 
mainly local capacities. Here anthropologists could make a valuable contribution. 
Unfortunately the humanitarian enterprise is still dominated by Western actors and 
concepts.  
I share the view of Bryer and Cairns that humanitarian assistance of the international 
community should be seen “as a parallel response, not a charitable offering, to the 
willingness of most civilians caught up in conflict to support themselves and other 
victims” (1997: 373), as we will see in the chapter about civil society in Burma.  
 45 
3. Burma – an Introduction 
In this section I will give a brief overview of Burma including basic facts, historical 
and political background as well as the realms of foreign relations, ethnicity, the 
economy, social issues and the human rights situation. 
Burma at a Glance2 
Official name: Union of Myanmar 
Independence: January 1948 
Capital: Rangoon (Yangon)  
Seat of Government since 2006: Nay Pyi Taw (near Pyinmana) 
Area: 676,578 sq km3   
Neighbouring countries: Bangladesh and India in the West, China in the North, 
Thailand and Laos in the East; 
Constituent States:  
Burma is comprised of seven Divisions: Tenasserim, Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Pegu, 
Magwe, Mandalay, and Sagaing; and seven States: Mon, Karen, Karenni, Shan, 
Kachin, Chin and Arakan.  
Government: Military junta since 1962 
                                                
2 as of 2010. 
3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 2010. The World Fact Book: Burma [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [Accessed 15 July 2010]. 
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Head of State: Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) and Chief of the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw); 
Prime Minister: Lieutnant General Soe Win 
Cabinet: The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is comprised of 11 
military generals.  
Memberships: UNO (1948), Non-Aligned Movement (1992), ASEAN (1997); 
Population: 48,85 million / Growth rate: 1,3% 4  
Ethnic composition: Burman 68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, 
Chin 2%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, others 3% (e.g. Kachin, Wa); 
136 ethnic groups 5 
Languages: Burmese, numerous minority ethnic languages; 
Religions: Buddhist 89%, Christian 4%, Muslim 4%, animist 1%, other 2% 6 
Military: Military spending has been estimated at between 30 – 45% of public 
expenditure.7 400,000 people in the armed forces8, 70,000 of which are child soldiers 
(17.5%);9  
Currency: kyat 
GDP per capita: 99 USD10 
Natural Resources: Natural gas, timber, tin, antimony, zinc, copper, tungsten, lead, 
coal, limestone, precious stones, hydropower, marine products, petroleum;  
Export partners: Thailand, India, China, US, EU, Singapore, Japan; 
Import partners: Singapore, China, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand; 
                                                
4 ECONOMIST INTELLIGNCE UNIT 2003. Country Profile – Myanmar. 
5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 2010. The World Fact Book: Burma [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [Accessed 15 July 2010]. 
6 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE July 2010. Background Note: Burma. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
7 SELTH, A. 2002. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power without Glory, Norwalk CT, Eastbridge.  
8 ibid.  
9 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Oct 2002. "My Gun Was As Tall As Me". Child Soldiers in Burma. 
10 ALTSEAN-BURMA 2004. Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns Volume 1. Bangkok.  
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Health: The WHO ranks Burma’s public health care system 190th out of 19111 and 
the IMF estimated public health expenditure at 0,19% of GDP or 2,7% of state 
expenditure.12 
Life expectancy: 60,8 years 13 
Infant mortality rate:  
75 deaths/1000 live births 14 
Malnutrition rate: 36% of children under 5 years of age 15 
HIV/AIDS infection rate: Estimated at 687,000 people or 3,46% of adults (aged 15 - 
44). 16 
Education: 0,3% of GDP is spent on education17 and only 30% of children finish 
primary school.18 
Environmental degradation: 19 
Mass tourism, deforestation, overfishing, monocropping, lack of sewerage and clean 
drinking water, pollution through oil/gas production, , large-scale projects e.g. dams; 
                                                
11 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 2002. The world health report 2002 - Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life. 
12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 2002. International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2002. 
13 UNDP 2005. Annual Report 2005. 
14 ibid. 
15 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 2003. Key Indicators 2003: Education for Global Participation. 
16 BEYRER, C., RAZAK, M. H., LABRIQUE, A. & BROOKMEYER, R. 2003. Assessing the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS 
Epidemic in Burma. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 32: 3, 311-317. 
17 NONVIOLENCE INTERNATIONAL Aug 2002. Myanmar’s Expenditures on the Military, Health and Education. Special 
Report. 
18 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 2003. Country Profile – Myanmar. 
19 PIRES DOS REIS-KECKEIS, M. 2006. Humanitäre Hilfe in Burma: ein Widerspruch? Diplomarbeit, Universität Wien.  
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Figure 1: Map of Burma 20 
                                                
20 DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT/CARTOGRAPHIC SECTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. May 2008. Myanmar. 
United Nations.  
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Historical and Political Background 
Struggle for Independence (1930s-1948) 
The British Empire annexes Burma in 1886 after three Anglo-Burmese wars. In the 
1930s Burman nationalists begin agitating against colonial rule and turn to the 
Japanese, who provide them with military training. Thus the Burma Independence 
Army (BIA) is founded under General Aung San, who succeeds in driving out the 
British with Japanese help during the Second World War in 1942. Burma is declared 
independent in 1943 but soon it is evident that the Japanese are yet another colonial 
power and so the BIA defects to the Allies and drive out the Japanese in 1945. Once 
again the country comes under British colonial administration but the British agree to 
hand over power to General Aung San, leader of both the BIA and the nationalist 
civilian Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), who negotiates the 
Panglong Agreement and wins the 1947 elections. However, Aung San and some of 
his cabinet members are assassinated the same year. Burma finally becomes 
independent on 4 January 1948 (NCGUB, 2009: 4).  
Parliamentary Era (1948-1962) 
Between 1948 and 1958 Burma experiments with democracy for the first time. The 
elected government of Prime Minister U Nu and the AFPFL party is weak and thus 
over-challenged with communist insurgency and armed struggle by ethnic groups, 
especially the Karen, who form the Karen National Union (KNU), the oldest and 
largest remaining insurgent group. The Burmese military is under-resourced and 
initially incapable of suppressing the numerous insurgencies throughout the country. 
As a consequence the military is given a number of new powers and undergoes a 
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drastic over-haul, which allows it to gain a position of great influence over civilian 
affairs. Defence minister Ne Win expands his role in state affairs as head of counter-
insurgency operations. Factionalism and the growing instability in the country prompt 
U Nu to resign in 1958 and to recommend General Ne Win as the head of state of a 
“caretaker government” until new elections can be held (NCGUB, 2009: 4-6).  
The Caretaker Government consolidates the army’s power further. It uses a military 
intelligence apparatus and propaganda to monitor and control the civilian population, 
and where this doesn’t work, indiscriminate violence is the rule (ibid.: 6-7).  The 
economic and security situation is poor. The military runs a broad range of economic 
activities and in addition increases the number of military personnel within 
administration at all levels. These changes entail “[…] a pervasive sense of pride in 
military accomplishments […] that […] was the basis on which future military rule 
was built” (Steinberg, 2001: 18). Thus the Caretaker Government from 1958-1960 
sets the stage for the coup of 1962.  
U Nu is re-elected in 1960. However, this does not ameliorate escalating economic 
and internal problems, which cause widespread dissatisfaction with the government. 
In addition U Nu attempts some unpopular reforms that provoke further dissent. By 
this time the military is already too strong and the impoverished and divided 
population not able to unify and organise in opposition (NCGUB, 2009: 7).  
BSPP Military Rule (1962-1988) 
In 1962 General Ne Win seizes power through a military coup, suspends the 1947 
Constitution and rules through a Revolutionary Council. He proclaims the ‘Burmese 
Way to Socialism’, nationalizes all foreign owned enterprises and isolates the country 
from external influence (Altsean-Burma, 2004: 9). The only legitimate political party 
is the Burma Socialist People’s Party (BSPP), founded by the Revolutionary Council. 
A student protest against the regime is crushed violently, killing over 100 students. 
Psychological Warfare, mass mobilization, military intelligence agents and informers 
are used to counter any potential dissent. Especially ethnic minority areas are being 
subjected to increasing violence through the ‘four cuts’ policy, which aims at cutting 
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insurgents off from food, funds, recruits and intelligence. This policy is responsible 
for widespread destruction and human rights abuses (NCGUB, 2009: 8-9). In 1974 
the military adopts a new constitution that installs a highly centralized state and a one-
party system. Freedom of opinion is largely repressed and all internal publications are 
subject to rigid censorship. The “increasing latent societal discontent” is exacerbated 
by dire economic conditions (Steinberg, 2001: 22-24). Economic policy oriented to 
military requirements, isolation and civil war run the country down. In 1987 Burma is 
designated a ‘Least Developed Country’ by the UN (NCGUB, 2009: 11).  
Tension escalates in 1988. In March a student protest in Rangoon against the regime 
is crushed violently and thus sparks sustained student protests throughout spring and 
summer, which again claim hundreds of victims. As social unrest spreads, the military 
declares martial law (ibid.: 12). In July General Ne Win resigns and calls for a 
referendum to decide whether or not to change to a multi-party system, but the BSPP 
refuses the proposal (Charney, 2009: 151). General Sein Lwin is appointed as his 
successor. Popular outburst continues: ”[…] the pent-up economic and political 
frustrations that had built up exploded nationwide, with demonstrations, rioting, and 
looting that were suppressed with great loss of life” (Steinberg, 2001: 9). On 8 August 
1988 thousands of people peacefully take to the streets in a nationwide strike, calling 
for democracy and human rights. The military again reacts with unutterable violence, 
killing and arresting an estimated 3000 protesters. The event attracts the world’s 
attention and becomes one of the most infamous dates in Burmese history (NCGUB, 
2009: 12).  
Thereupon General Sein Lwin resigns and Dr. Maung Maung becomes head of a 
short-lived civilian period (ibid.: 12).  
SLORC Military Rule (1988-1997) 
Only a month later the military regains power through a coup and establishes the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). General Saw Maung announces that 
the sole aim of the military is to restore law and order, and that multi-party elections 
will be held. Nevertheless the SLORC declares martial law and continues to brutally 
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suppress opposition. Soon after the National League for Democracy (NLD) is 
founded under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of independence hero General Aung 
San, and quickly emerges as the leading opposition party. However, the SLORC 
frustrates the campaigns of its political opponents, puts Suu Kyi under house arrest 
and disqualifies her from the elections. Still the NLD achieves an overwhelming 
victory in the 1990 elections, winning 392 out of 485 parliamentary seats. The 
military does not respect the results however and refuses to hand over power under 
the pretext that a new constitution needs to be drafted first (NCGUB, 2009: 12-13). 
This is the starting point of a “politics of delay” (Charney, 2009: 170) in order to 
prevent any shift of power. Since NLD members are subsequently harassed and 
arrested, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) is 
founded as parallel government in exile (NCGUB, 2009: 13).  
In 1992, Than Shwe replaces General Saw Maung as head of state. Finally, in 1993, 
the National Convention (NC) assembles and meets sporadically over the next four 
years in order to draft basic principles for the new constitution. However the NC is 
bound to guidelines established by the regime, which guarantee “a dominant role for 
the military in any future Burmese government” (ibid.: 13). In 1995, after almost six 
years, Suu Kyi is released from house arrest. A few months later the NLD withdraws 
from the NC due to its undemocratic nature. Thereupon the SLORC expels all the 
NLD delegates permanently. Political arrests and persecution, especially of NLD 
members, accelerate further. In addition the SLORC implements another military 
expansion and surveillance heightens. Between 1989 and 1995 the regime signs one-
sided ceasefire agreements with most armed ethnic groups, often through force (ibid.: 
14-15), which at least improve the humanitarian and social situation (Lorch and 
Pasch, 2007). The most important exception to the ceasefires is the KNU operating on 
the border to Thailand (ibid.: 1). In 1996 Burma opens to tourism (Röggla, 2006: 29). 
The same year the NC is adjourned to an unspecified date and in 1997 Burma joins 
ASEAN (Altsean-Burma, 2004: 10). The SLORC moves towards a market economy, 
but its privileges increase at the expense of the people (NCGUB, 2009: 13).  
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SPDC Military Rule (1997-2010) 
In 1997 the SLORC reorganizes and changes its name to the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC). In 2000 Suu Kyi is once again put under house arrest 
for about 19 months. In the years 2000-2002 UN brokered talks between the regime 
and Suu Kyi take place until the SPDC stalls them without having achieved any 
outcome. In 2003 members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association 
(USDA), a mass mobilization organisation founded by the military in 1993, attack 
Suu Kyi’s convoy. In this so-called Depayin Massacre an estimated hundred NLD 
members and supporters are killed, injured or imprisoned. Suu Kyi is re-arrested until 
November 2010. The ensuing crackdown of the democracy movement provokes an 
international outcry and tougher economic sanctions by the US and the EU (NCGUB, 
2009: 16-17).  
Later that year General Khin Nyunt is appointed as Prime Minister and announces the 
‘Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy’, which envisions the reconvention of the NC, a 
new constitution and free elections. In 2004 the NC reconvenes under highly 
restrictive conditions for the first time since 1996, but the NLD and eight other 
political parties boycott the session as their requests for a democratic process have not 
been met (ibid.: 18-19). A few months later Khin Nyunt, who became too powerful 
and liberal (Nyein, 2009: 640), is arrested on alleged corruption charges and replaced 
by Soe Win. A purge of the Military Intelligence follows (Altsean-Burma, 2004: 10-
11).  
In 2005 the SPDC unexpectedly creates a new capital city inland, near Pyinmana, 
called Naypyidaw Myodaw. The reasons are never satisfactorily explained but it is 
assumed that there was a demand for greater security since the demonstrations in 
1988 and a more easily managed, central site. In addition, Rangoon, close to the coast, 
is more vulnerable to foreign powers (Charney, 2009: 193-194).  
The NC meets twice in 2005 and twice in 2006 before going into recess without any 
discernable advancement. The sessions are accompanied by targeting and harassing of 
opposition groups as well as increased hostilities in ethnic areas to silence resistance 
(NCGUB, 2009: 20-21). The NLD’s Union Day proposal of 2006, offering the SPDC 
a deal, is rejected (ibid.: 23).  
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In 2007 public outrage against the regime boils over “in the single-largest display of 
discontent” since 1988 (ibid.: 23). In August the government issues an overnight 
increase in fuel prices, which entails a further increase of already inflated commodity 
prices. Mass protests break out across the country (Charney, 2009: 196), initiated by a 
newly founded group of student activists named ‘88 Generation’ (South, 2008b: 137), 
and carry on into September, highlighting the desperation of the general population. 
The regime reacts once more with violence, crushing demonstrations and arresting 
protesters (Charney, 2009: 196). In September an estimated 1000 monks begin to join 
thousands of civilians in the so-called ‘Saffron Revolution’, which refers to the 
saffron-coloured robes of the monks (NCGUB, 2009: 23). When the army beats 
protesting monks, monastic protests spread throughout the country and monks start to 
refuse donations from the families of the military elite, which denies them of the 
possibility to earn merit in Buddhist belief. However, even though harming a monk 
earns one bad merit, the military reacts by beating, shooting and arresting monastic 
and other protestors, and by raiding monasteries (Charney, 2009: 197). The death toll 
remains unknown, as information networks were cut and bodies burnt in an attempt to 
hide any evidence. According to estimates it may be as high as 100. After the protests 
the SPDC searches for participants, arresting thousands well into 2008 and thus 
forcing hundreds to flee the country (NCGUB, 2009: 24-25).  
The results of the NC are announced in September 2007, which are only a set of 
guidelines for the new constitution, guaranteeing military dominance. In December 
the government announces that the constitution will be written by a 54-member 
commission, nominated by the SPDC (Charney, 2009: 195).  
Still recovering from the Saffron Revolution, the country is thrown back into crisis by 
Cyclone Nargis that strikes the coast on 2-3 May 2008 and affects an estimated 2.4 
million people. Even though the SPDC knew about the storm since 26 April, it did not 
evacuate or warn the population (NCGUB, 2009: 25). Even after the cyclone, the 
regime does little to help its own people as Charney describes: “The regime delayed 
for three weeks in admitting most international aid, refusing visas to aid workers and 
storing in warehouses the few supplies it allowed to be flown in, while it proceeded 
with the constitutional referendum and informed the world that there was no crisis” 
(2009: 199). The referendum is held on 10 May and, due to international pressure, on 
24 May in the worst affected areas. However, the SPDC already announces the result 
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on 15 May, stating that the constitution has been approved with 92.4% of voters in 
favour. The opposition and the international community reject these election results 
(NCGUB, 2009: 25-26). The new constitution confirms the current power position of 
the military, consolidated as never before.  Moreover the ‘coup d’état clause’ entitles 
the military to revert to direct rule whenever it deems necessary (Nyein, 2009: 647). 
Thus the constitution merely provides the regime with a civilian cover and codifies its 
predominant role in Burma’s politics (ibid.: 639).  
Above all, harassment of civil society and the political opposition increases further 
still (ibid.: 647). In May 2009 Suu Kyi’s house arrest is prolonged under the pretext 
that she illegally hosted an American intruder (ibid.: 644). In addition, the new 
election laws of March 2010 prohibit political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and 
Buddhist monks from participation in order to make sure that the SPDC keeps in 
power (JHA, 2010). As a result of decade-long repression the NLD is basically 
destroyed and at this time a politically organised, civil alternative to the military does 
not exist (Löschmann, 2008: 7). In foresight of the planned elections, the regime tries 
to mobilise society in government-sponsored mass-organisations (Nyein, 2009: 647). 
The elections are finally held on 7 November 2010 and are unsurprisingly won by the 
USDP, as usual through unfair and undemocratic proceedings. 
The military’s pervasive control over the economy and the natural resources poses 
one of the biggest obstacles for any real power change. This monopoly supplies the 
regime with constant funding and thus annuls international sanctions (ibid.: 640).  
In addition the military has proven surprisingly resilient and stable (ibid.: 640). 
Driven by the idea of its historic exceptionalism and mission, it is constantly 
expanding its skills and expertise and thus creating a “new military professionalism” 
(ibid.: 647).  
Taking these aspects into account, I agree with Nyein that the regime has no intention 
of loosening its grip on power and allowing a non-military government to be formed. 
It rather uses the constitutional process to expand its role and to push back citizenry 
even further.  
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Foreign Relations 
After 1988 Burma’s foreign policy changes from neutralism and isolation during the 
cold war to a more outward looking policy in an attempt to catch up with its 
neighbours. Accordingly it joins a number of international organisations and 
institutions, e.g. it rejoins the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992. However, Burma’s 
domestic politics provoke Western criticism, pressure and economic sanctions and 
consequently its foreign policy mainly takes up the cause of defending the state. The 
government insists on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other 
countries and joins organisations of likeminded states. Thus, the initial outward reach 
turns into a withdrawal into Asian politics and economy. Soon it becomes apparent, 
that Burma is impervious to US/EU investment and trade sanctions due to its little 
foreign trade and Asian trade partners (Taylor, 2009: 463-466), who supply the 
regime also with weapons, military equipment and other resources (Löschmann, 
2008).  
The violent repression of the 2007 mass protests puts Burma back on the international 
political agenda. China, Thailand and India deplore the regime’s actions and have, as 
Burma’s main trading partners, the best chance to exert pressure. However, as 
neighbour countries they are more interested in Burma’s stability and in maintaining 
good relations with the regime because they are already confronted with severe 
security, health and humanitarian problems in the border regions (ibid.: 2), which lead 
to recurring tensions with Thailand. India, after initially condemning the regime in the 
90s, and China compete for influence in and access to the country’s politics, markets 
and natural resources, especially gas and oil (Taylor, 2009: 469). China is Burma’s 
most important neighbour and serves the immediate needs of the SPDC “for guns, 
funds, and friends” (Steinberg, 2001: 234). However, its increased official and 
unofficial role in trade and physical presence in the country, causes the military to 
fear Chinese economic domination and a relationship of dependence (ibid.: 229). Also 
Japan is concerned about China’s growing influence and, unlike the West, calls for 
engagement and action, thus being the largest aid donor in Burma (Hingst, 2007: 48).  
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Despite opposition from the US and the EU, Burma joins ASEAN in 1997. One of its 
main principles is the non-interference into internal affairs of member countries, 
which is due to autocratic traditions in other member states in the interest of all. Yet, 
after the incidents of 2007 the institution breaks with this principle for the first time 
and Indonesia, Malaysia and even Singapore, one of the major providers of the 
military elite, voice criticism (Löschmann, 2008: 7). Their willingness to defend the 
military regime already dissipated after 2003 because of increasing Western pressure, 
but still they refuse economic sanctions arguing that they would be counterproductive 
(Taylor, 2009: 463-466).  
As a consequence Western governments put increasing pressure on the United 
Nations. This leads to the adoption of a Special Rapporteur for human rights and a 
special envoy, which shows little effect though. In 2005/6 the US succeeds in putting 
Burma on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, however, a joint 
US/UK draft resolution is vetoed by Russia and China in 2007 (ibid.: 469-470). Since 
1994 UN-Resolutions have been suggesting that dialogue between all three parties – 
the government, the NLD and representatives of the ethnic groups – is essential 
(Löschmann, 2008: 7). 
Burma is of strategic interest for Asia’s Great Powers and especially Chinese interests 
protect the regime of any intervention by the West or other countries.  Burma’s 
foreign relations are very unstable though (Hingst, 2007: 48) and affected by its 
nationalism, xenophobia and mistrust. Thus, assuring state security is the main focus 
of its foreign policy, which was exemplified in 2008 when the regime resisted 
Western aid efforts after Cyclone Nargis (Taylor, 2009: 471).  
Ethnicity 
Steinberg describes the ethnic dimension as “the single most explosive element in 
contemporary Myanmar” (2001: 46). Being one of the most ethnically diverse 
countries in the world with over 100 linguistic groups and seven big ethnic groups, 
Burma struggles with historic antagonism and deep distrust between the majority 
ethnic group of the Burmans and the numerous ethnic minorities. The former make up 
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60% of the population and reside mainly in the country’s central plane, whereas the 
latter live in the periphery around it, a horseshoe arc of hills and mountains, which 
accounts for 60% of Burma’s area (Bü nte, 2007: 33). 
The ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British privileges the minorities under indirect rule 
- which is the reason for continuing secessionist movements of the Shan, Karen, 
Kachin and others - while the centre is governed directly. The ruling class is 
eliminated and uprisings are suppressed with troops that mainly consist of minority 
peoples, which causes national sentiment and hatred against minorities among 
Burmans (Lukas, 2006: 110). Thus the problem of ethnic minorities in today’s sense 
developed with colonial rule (ibid.: 67). When the mainly Burman national movement 
achieves independence, resentments have already further deepened and result in a 
civil war. Nevertheless Aung San succeeds in convincing the minorities in the 1947 
Panglong Agreement of a joint future in a federally organised Union of Burma 
(Bü nte, 2007: 33-34), which has provisions for the secession of the Shan and Karen 
States (Steinberg, 2001: 47). It doesn’t last long though and since 1962, when the 
military takes over power under the pretext of wanting to prevent a breakdown of the 
state, most of the minorities have been fighting against the government. Repression, 
arrogance and the continued insistence on a unitary, centralized state by the mainly 
Burman military entail further alienation between the minority peoples and the rulers 
(Bü nte, 2007: 34). Attempts to instill a sense of national unity fail and till today the 
union is merely held together by force (Steinberg, 2001: 187). The ceasefires of the 
1990s have been successful in reducing combat operations, but nonetheless are fragile 
due to their informality and the absence of disarming. The military is still in armed 
conflict with several ethnic groups, e.g. the Karen, Shan and Kachin, which has been 
claiming thousands of victims (Bü nte, 2007: 34). The establishment of the ‘Ethnic 
Nationalities Council’ (ENC) in 2001 (as the ‘Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and 
Cooperation Committee’) is the first step to give voice to Burma’s numerous ethnic 
groups: “It was entrusted with the task of fostering unity and cooperation between all 
ethnic nationalities in preparation for a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ and a transition to 
democracy” (2010).  
The ethnic tensions after independence must also be considered in connection with 
another aspect though. With decolonisation a common phenomenon in South-East-
Asia comes to the fore: Internal Colonialism. It refers to the ethnically coined, 
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unequal centre-periphery-relations in the new nation state, in which the interests of 
the peoples living in the periphery are not represented through the elites of the 
Burman dominated central government. This entails ethnic nationalism (ethnic elites 
prefer the designation nationality rather than minority for their communities), 
secessionist and resistance movements of the minorities living in peripheral, 
undeveloped and ecologically disadvantageous areas. The politically and 
demographically dominant ethnic group secures state unity through military 
measures. Burman Ethnocentrism takes the shape of prejudices (Lukas, 2006: 64-66) 
and discrimination, e.g. minority languages are not taught in the public education 
system (Steinberg, 2001: 184) or are even forbidden. In its most extreme form it leads 
to the ‘Burmanisation’ (also referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing policy’) of culture and 
history by imposing a notion of Burmesenes and suppressing diverse social identities 
(South, 2008b: 28). To this day ethnic minorities are subjected to propaganda, the 
‘four cuts’ policy, serious human rights violations and ultimately genocide, which 
forced an estimated 2 million people to flee to neighbouring countries, mainly 
Thailand but also Bangladesh, India and China (Röggla, 2006: 117). In order to 
protect themselves most ethnic groups founded their own armies with the National 
Democratic Front (NDF), which is a union of nine ethnic armies, being the most 
important one (ibid.: 97).  
Economy 
In the mid 1950s Burma is still the biggest rice exporter in the world. However, 
political and economic isolation under the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ turns the 
country into a socioeconomic powder keg and results in its categorization as a Least 
Developed Country (LDC) by the UN since 1987. These grievances finally lead to the 
mass demonstrations of 1988 (Pires Dos Reis-Keckeis, 2006: 31-32). As a 
consequence the regime moves towards an open-market system and uses the little 
economic growth of the 1990s as power legitimisation (Hingst, 2007: 24). However, 
these developments are not sustainable and do not improve the living conditions of 
the people. Public revenues are mainly used for the military and its modernization 
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whereas investments in agriculture, the largest economic sector, and in social tasks 
remain low (ibid.: 32-33). The main sources of revenue are agricultural products, 
timber (Burma owns 75% of the world’s teakwood reserves), lease of fishing rights, 
gas/oil, precious stones and tourism. Moreover, Burma’s black economy accounts for 
up to 40% of the country’s economic performance (Röggla, 2006: 41), e.g. illegal 
deforestation, smuggling, money laundering as well as trafficking of drugs, humans 
and arms (Pires Dos Reis-Keckeis, 2006: 32), and has serious cross-border impacts.  
In conclusion it can be said, that the country’s natural resources hold an enormous 
development potential but that the junta’s serious economic mismanagement can be 
held responsible for Burma’s stagnant economy (Hingst, 2007: 33-34). 
Social Issues 
The social development goes hand in hand with the economic development. Thereby 
Burma’s initial position was fairly good in the pre-colonial and colonial period 
compared to other countries in the region. Even though there was shared but not 
desperate poverty, Burma was considered a rich country before World War II. Since 
1962, however, a decline in the quality of life begins to show as a result of war and 
economic mismanagement. It is not until the 1970s that the per capita income reaches 
pre-war levels and the social situation deteriorates further in the 1990s. Poverty is 
widespread but not evenly distributed as it is higher in the dry Magwe district of 
central Burma and the minority areas. Forced relocations exacerbate the situation 
further. Salaries have not kept pace with inflation and thus households spend more 
money on food. Social indicators and data vary but at least half of the population can 
be considered poor. In addition, there is a growing disparity between the poor and the 
rich with the military profiting disproportionately of the country’s economic and 
social resources (Steinberg, 2001: 198-206).  
Poverty has direct impacts on education. Children drop out of school because they are 
needed for farm labour and because informal school fees are too high. Together with 
the general decline of public education this leads to the establishment of ‘tuition 
schools’. They provide students with the education that the public schools have failed 
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to provide and teachers with supplemental income without which they could not 
survive. Even though education has been a priority of all governments since 
independence, school attendance figures have dropped drastically at all levels since 
1988 and the fall in incomes. The once good reputation of Burma as a literate society 
eroded. Since 1962, colleges and universities have been closed about 20% of the time 
due to student protests. In addition a system of ‘distance education’ serves the 
political purpose of not giving the students any opportunity to assemble. Moreover 
subject content is subjected to censorship and corruption grows. Investments in the 
education sector have decreased since 1988 while military expenditures have risen. 
Education quality and educational standards have thus deteriorated. Over 70% of the 
population have not gone beyond primary school. Also employment is scarce for 
university graduates and so students are not motivated to study (ibid.: 206-210).  
The health situation has always been problematic due to the tropical climate and the 
inability of the government to deliver effective health services (ibid.: 210). While 
there was some success in the health sector during the socialist era, regression since 
1988 has worsened the situation. Besides Cambodia, Burma has the worst sanitary 
infrastructure in whole of Southeast Asia. Spending on health has seriously decreased 
with only 0.18% of GDP in 1997/98. As a consequence infant mortality, malaria 
infections and malnutrition have risen, and diseases like tuberculosis, leprosy and 
cholera have spread anew (Hingst, 2007: 38-39). One of the biggest problems is the 
exploding HIV/AIDS infection rate through increased intravenous drug use, rapacious 
activities of the Burmese army and the sex industry. Burmese women, who worked as 
cheap prostitutes in Thailand, spread the disease upon their return (Steinberg, 2001: 
212). In the mid-90s the WHO estimated that 400.000 to 500.000, respectively about 
2% of the grown population, are infected, which is per definition already an epidemic. 
Still the government is reluctant to admit the interrelated problems of drug use, 
prostitution and AIDS due to cultural reasons. An AIDS-campaign would confess 
them officially and also the regime would have to own up to their guilt regarding the 
reasons for these problems: social despair and lack of prospects (Hingst, 2007: 39). 
Hence there has been an alarming explosion in the production, sale and use of opium 
and its derivates morphine and heroin - making Burma the biggest opium producer in 
the world - as well as of synthetic drugs like amphetamines and methamphetamines. 
The drugs are mainly produced in the Burmese part of the Golden Triangle (the 
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border area of Burma, Thailand and Laos), which results in increased drug addiction 
in neighbouring countries, especially in the border areas. Antinarcotics activities have 
not proven successful and there is evidence that the drug trade finances not only many 
of the rebellions but also the military regime itself (Steinberg, 2001: 215-218). The 
USA charges Burma as ‘narco-state’ as it is “directly benefiting from the narcotics 
trade, harbouring drug criminals, and countenancing money laundering from the 
trade” (ibid.: 217). In the drug producing regions the social and political situation 
under warlords is even worse than in the rest of the country and only a few at the top 
benefit of the lucrative business (Hingst, 2007: 41-42).  
Human Rights Situation 
“Regardless of international pressure and condemnation, the regime 
continued to commit severe and widespread human rights abuses against 
the civilian population of Burma, including the use of forced labour, 
forcible recruitment of child soldiers, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary 
arrests, rape, torture, forced relocation and the confiscation of property. 
Similarly, the regime continued to heavily restrict fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, press, movement, 
and religion. While such abuses were committed under the rubric of 
counter-insurgency, security and development; in actuality they have 
significantly impeded civilian’s attempts to sustain their livelihoods, and 
have created large scale human insecurity within the country.” 
(NCGUB, 2009: 23) 
All reports on the human rights situation in Burma are uniformly pessimistic with 
devastating results for Burma’s public prestige. Despite international pressure and 
sanctions, the regime denies and continues to commit severe human rights abuses.  
The government does not allow freedom of expression or free forming of political 
will. Opposition parties are forbidden or harassed and muzzled (Röggla, 2006: 61). 
Press and television are under state command and the Press Scrutiny Board (PSB) 
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screens all publications (Steinberg, 2001: 84). A close meshed spy system prevents 
the people from talking about prevailing grievances. Political opponents are sentenced 
to long lasting imprisonments in show trials and often forgotten in prison after 
termination of their penalty. Torture, beatings, insufficient food and medical 
treatment, isolation and the prohibition to read and write dominate everyday life of 
prisoners. Opposition leaders are often in solitary confinement for years (Röggla, 
2006: 61). Amnesty International estimates the number of political prisoners at 2.100 
in 2007 (2009: 1). 
The population is subjected to forced relocations and ethnic minorities are 
systematically suppressed through arbitrary killings, rape, torture, pillage, kidnapping, 
and destruction of food, property and livelihoods as well as deprivation of education. 
Forced labour, which is especially used for roads and other touristic and public 
infrastructure, is widespread and affects all age levels of the population. Forced 
porters serve as live mine detectors. Also child labour and child abduction are 
common. The army holds 70.000 child soldiers between the ages of 11 and 18, 
making it the world’s largest child soldier-army. Often children are kidnapped, 
without the knowledge and consent of their parents (Röggla, 2006: 61). They are 
made compliant and brutal through violence and amphetamines (ibid.: 65). 
Human rights abuses by the military interfere with all areas of human life and the list 
of unutterable atrocities is growing daily, making it impossible to give a full account.  
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4. Humanitarian Space in Burma 
As we can see from the second chapter, humanitarian assistance in CEs confronts the 
international aid community with a bulk of problems and challenges. In this chapter I 
will explore the key challenge in the Burmese context, namely the difficulty of 
maintaining humanitarian space.  
In Burma the space for humanitarian assistance is being restricted due to increasing 
violence against aid workers and increasingly hostile state regulations of the action of 
aid agencies (Addison, 2008: 69). However, foreign aid is not only obstructed by 
constraints caused by the regime but also by pro-democracy activists overseas. Thus, 
in this chapter I will look at how these two factors restrict humanitarian space in 
Burma. 
Yet, despite the restrictive aid environment, it is also possible to carve out 
humanitarian space. In Burma, the lack of access to vulnerable populations has led to 
the development of cross-border aid through networks of local staff, agents and 
partner organisations (ibid.: 69). Also, there has been a quiet expansion of Burmese 
civil society at the local level (Dalpino, 2009: 3), which shows that civilians are not 
mere victims of the military regime but rather political actors who address the basic 
needs of their communities through a variety of institutions and self-help initiatives. 
In the second part of this chapter I will demonstrate how these two forms of assistance 
successfully create humanitarian space under authoritarian rule.  
Before exploring how humanitarian space is restricted and created, I will give a brief 
overview of current humanitarian assistance to Burma.  
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Current Humanitarian Assistance to Burma 
Assistance to Burma takes on two forms according to its delivery channel: 
1. Assistance ‘via Rangoon’ (via state spaces) is implemented by engaging the 
state to access the people. This approach is the norm among UN agencies, big 
INGOs and most governments, many of who are obliged to operate this way 
by mandates. Also some areas of central Burma cannot be reached otherwise. 
This requires a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the regime, 
which pledges aid agencies to comply with government restrictions on their 
operating environment. Thus, however, they restrict their operations to state-
controlled spaces, where the military interferes with their programs and hence 
make neutrality and impartiality impossible. Yet at the same time, many 
INGOs refuse to work in non-state spaces on the grounds, that resistance 
forces are active there. As a result their call for greater humanitarian access 
equates to a call for expansion of state spaces, as they do not operate 
elsewhere, which would repress civil society even more (Malseed, 2009: 381-
382). 
2. ‘Cross-border’ assistance (via non-state spaces, but sometimes partly 
controlled by opposition groups) circumvents the state to access the people. 
This takes the form of relief and medical aid smuggled across the border from 
neighbouring countries (mainly Thailand) to help IDPs in non-state spaces 
(ethnic minority areas) so they can survive in hiding from the military (ibid.: 
385). This type of aid, delivered directly to civilian communities outside 
military-controlled channels also strengthens the position of the villagers in 
relation to the military and thus supports their resistance strategies (Phan and 
Hull, 2008: 19). Cross-border aid is by definition illegal, as it challenges the 
sovereignty of the Burmese government (South, 2008b: 97), and thus big aid 
agencies cannot officially support these initiatives. The delivery of aid is 
covert and dangerous involving night marches through heavily landmined 
mountains with armed resistance forces as escorts. These initiatives are mainly 
locally designed and controlled and run by villagers and refugees. Cross-
border aid accepts civilian links to armed groups as legitimate survival 
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strategies, which secure access for delivery. Aid is distributed based on needs 
rather than political identity, which makes it impartial, but its neutrality is still 
contested. While this form of assistance is still a very successful way of 
creating humanitarian space despite government restrictions and of alleviating 
the suffering in areas that cannot be reached from inside Burma, it is criticised 
for its unofficial way of operation and consequently severely under-resourced. 
International donors refuse to fund cross-border aid because some might be 
diverted to resistance forces and because bureaucracy, monitoring and 
evaluation are not possible the way demanded by Western donors. Therefore it 
is supplied only sporadically and in small quantities by local organisations and 
some small INGOs in neighbouring countries (Malseed, 2009: 385), e.g. the 
Austrian non-profit association ‘Burmahilfe’ as we will see in a later chapter. 
Both forms of relief activity face the same major constraints: limited capacities and 
funding, plus government restrictions and the dangers of providing aid in areas of 
ongoing armed conflict (South, 2008b: 107). The important difference is, however, 
that aid agencies operating inside Burma via state spaces have to cooperate with the 
regime to a certain degree, whereas cross-border aid operates in non-state spaces 
independently of the regime and is hence able to construct humanitarian space despite 
government restrictions by circumventing the state. Still it is dependent on the good 
will of authorities from neighbouring countries, which usually tolerate aid operations 
though.  
The Debate on Engagement 
The violent suppression of the 1988 uprisings not only triggered the withdrawal of the 
majority of aid to Burma, but also a general debate about the role of humanitarian and 
development aid to Burma. Cyclone Nargis intensified this debate and led to 
increasing calls for rethinking the opposition to the allocation of aid funds to Burma 
(Banki, 2009: 48, 66).  
The two positions of the debate differ in their notion of how Burma’s political and 
humanitarian situation can be tackled: 
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• Pro-Aid-Position:  
An increase of foreign aid is necessary in order to prevent a humanitarian 
crisis. As humanitarian aid contributes to the development of civil society 
structures and can be used as bargaining chips towards the regime, it abets 
democratisation in the long run. The International Crisis Group (ICG) for 
instance and several INGOs take this stance (Lorch, 2005: 9).  
• Anti-Aid-Position:  
The root causes of Burma’s humanitarian crisis are political, thus only 
political change can improve the humanitarian situation. Foreign aid does not 
reach the people (ibid.: 9) but rather legitimises and strengthens the military 
regime, and undermines its motivation to reform (ICG, 2002: 15). This 
position is associated with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition party NLD 
and the democratic opposition in exile, even though they already relativised 
their standpoint, as well as the US government, which imposed broad 
sanctions against the regime (Lorch, 2005: 9-10).  
The question of whether and how humanitarian aid should be delivered to Burma is 
an issue of ongoing debate and confronts the international community with a political 
dilemma, which is reflected in the aid flows.  
Aid Flows  
Since its independence Burma has received varying types and levels of aid from 
different donors, including official development assistance and humanitarian aid from 
UN institutions (Banki, 2009: 52). After the coup of 1962 most aid programs halted 
except those from the Japanese and the UN (Steinberg, 2001: 253). Since the late 
1960s aid to Burma again increased annually until the 1988 democracy uprising and 
subsequent crackdown when several countries, mainly Western donors but also 
others, significantly reduced aid assistance to the contested regime as part of a 
broader policy of sanctions. The EU for instance suspended development cooperation 
projects and cancelled debt relief among other punitive measures (Banki, 2009: 52). 
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Official development assistance dropped from 435 million USD in 1988 to 175 
million USD in 1989 (ibid.: 48). This massive decrease in foreign aid was attended by 
strict accountability and transparency regulations to ensure funds are not diverted to 
the military (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2010: 6). It was not until the 
mid-1990s that Burma witnessed a slight rise in both humanitarian and development 
assistance, though at lower levels than before the 1988 crackdown (Banki, 2009: 52). 
As South notes: “By 2007 about US$60 million was being channelled annually 
through Thailand-based organisations supporting displaced people in and from 
Burma. Most assistance was provided to the Karen and Karenni refugees, while about 
$2.5-3 million went to IDPs inside Burma. In contrast, the amount of humanitarian 
aid provided via Yangon remained minimal: prior to August 2005, when the UN 
Global Fund pulled out of Burma, total ODA was approximately $150 million per 
year, or less than $3 per person, compared with $47 per person for Cambodia and $63 
for Laos” (South, 2008b: 92). This trend changed temporarily in 2008 when Cyclone 
Nargis brought humanitarian aid to Burma to a record-high (Banki, 2009: 52, 55). 
Yet, after the immediate emergency the international community’s attention returned 
to politics and donors appear to be reverting to past policies (ICG, 2008: 12).  
Sources of International Assistance 
UN Agencies 
This representative group of UN agencies currently operates in Burma under MOUs 
with specific government ministries: UNDP, UNICEF, WHP, FAO, UNHCR, 
UNODC and UNAIDS. While their programs cover a broad spectrum of humanitarian 
and developmental activities, they have little impact due to government constraints, 
restrictive mandates, inadequate funding and limited access to the population. 
However, through their many local employees UN agencies play an important role in 
educating human resources for the future (Clapp, 2007: 52-53).  
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International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
The ILO founded an office in Rangoon in 2002. Even though the regime officially 
banned the imposition of forced labour in 2000, it is still a major problem; particularly 
the SPDC’s prosecution of people reporting instances and the apparent impunity for 
state officials. Under pressure from the ILO, which had threatened to refer Burma to 
the International Court of Justice and UN Security Council, the SPDC agreed to 
establish a mechanism enabling the organisation to investigate allegations of forced 
labour in 2007 (South, 2008b: 103).  
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Between 1998 and 2004 ICRC sub-delegations were established in five Burmese 
towns, from where teams implemented water, sanitation and other projects in conflict-
affected areas with the aim of providing ‘protection by presence’. Yet, after the purge 
of Khin Nyunt in 2004, the organisation experienced reduced access to most parts of 
eastern Burma. In 2007 the ICRC announced the closure of two of its field offices, 
stated that prison visits were also being systematically constrained and publicly 
denounced the military regime’s systematic abuse of prisoners and of civilians in 
conflict zones (ibid.: 103-104).  
International NGOs 
As of 2007, about 50 INGOs had MOUs with the government (ibid.: 104), including 
several European and Japanese groups,  and a few American and Australian groups. 
Like UN programs, INGO activity nurtures local talent and fosters the development of 
small indigenous NGOs, who often serve as implementers for their projects (Clapp, 
2007: 53-54). In general, INGOs operate with more independence than UN agencies, 
even though the government restricts their access to sensitive areas (South, 2008b: 
104).  
Donor Governments 
Very few donor governments are active in Burma due to their hesitation to support 
programs that might benefit the regime. Chief among these are the EU and a few 
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individual European governments, e.g. the UK and France. Japan is the single largest 
donor for grant aid with a focus on infrastructure. China finances large infrastructure 
projects through loans, but provides little if any grant assistance (Clapp, 2007: 54-55).  
Exile Resources 
After almost five decades of military rule, the Burmese diaspora has become rather 
extensive, including political activists. These play an important role as Clapp notes: 
“With the assistance and encouragement of US and European foundations and 
governments, some of these activists have also formed specialized groups that study 
various aspects of Burma’s institutional structures, articulating and planning the 
necessary reforms”. Hence, these diaspora structures will be extremely helpful in a 
future transition to democracy (ibid.: 55). In addition cross-border aid by groups in 
exile makes up a significant part of assistance to the Burmese population.  
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Restrictions on Humanitarian Space 
In the early 2000s increased humanitarian space and funding entailed an expansion of 
aid programs. General Khin Nyunt, the military intelligence chief from 1983 to 2004, 
actively facilitated broader humanitarian access, especially in respect to protection 
agencies such as the ILO, UNHCR and the ICRC. These cooperated directly with him 
and like-minded officials in order to start important new initiatives on forced labour, 
prison visits and so on. But also mainstream aid agencies were able to negotiate 
access to previously closed areas and to initiate programs addressing sensitive issues 
such as HIV/AIDS. Moreover they could often use military intelligence contacts to 
counter opposition from other parts of the regime (ICG, 2006: 5).  
Since the purge of Khin Nyunt in late 2004, however, humanitarian space again 
contracted. The military leadership has taken a more aggressively uncompromising, 
disobliging and nationalistic line and in some cases stopped cooperating with 
international agencies altogether (e.g. the Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights, 
ILO). Restrictions on programs and ongoing adjustments in the political and 
administrative system constrain the aid community’s ability to deliver assistance 
effectively, timely and responsibly (ibid.: 5). This was particularly evident in the 
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, when the initial delivery of assistance was 
severely constricted by government obstruction, as we will see in the correspondent 
chapter. Yet, in the course of the cyclone the number of international and local NGOs 
in the country has sharply increased and the aid programs that have since developed 
in the Irrawaddy delta have experienced an ease of operations and an expansion of 
humanitarian space. Despite this new openness and the government’s acquiescence to 
aid programs, attempts to expand access outside the delta to other parts of the country 
are still struggling (Kurtzer, 2009).  
Yet, renewed pressure on aid organisations is not only exerted by the regime, but also 
by pro-democracy activists overseas who – though increasingly open – still mainly 
oppose humanitarian assistance to Burma. This curtails humanitarian space as well, 
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which was demonstrated by the withdrawal of the Global Fund in 2005 (ICG, 2006: 
1).  
In addition to these constraints, aid agencies struggle with limited funding due to 
donor concerns about a possible mishandling of aid and with a pervasive lack of 
capacity at all levels of state and society (ICG, 2008: 20-21). The general dangers of 
providing aid in a country with ongoing armed conflict, especially violence against 
aid workers, add to the problem. 
However, it is important to note, that there is no consistent account of humanitarian 
space in Burma as it fluctuates significantly according to the overall political situation 
and the government’s attitude towards international assistance as well as according to 
various factors that determine the impact of government restrictions on aid programs 
(e.g. type of program, location etc.). Thus, the impact of restrictions varies between 
agencies and programs and different actors experience a different extent and quality 
of humanitarian space with some even stating that they do not encounter any major 
problems. Despite restrictions, international organizations stress that they are still able 
to achieve meaningful results (Melito, 2007: 25), especially when they have ‘scaled 
down’ to local level and engaged the population directly (Malseed, 2009: 381). Also, 
agencies have become adept at working in spaces that are visible only from the 
ground and in some cases find support from officials at the working level (ICG, 2006: 
14). Thus, the creation of humanitarian space inside Burma is possible to a certain 
extent, e.g. through humanitarian diplomacy.  
Consequently this chapter cannot give a full account of these various perspectives and 
is rather an attempt to identify some general ways of how humanitarian space in 
Burma is restricted and to exemplify these. I will first illustrate the constraints caused 
by the regime including a case study of Cyclone Nargis and then move on to explore 
the constraints caused by international activism exemplified by the Global Fund 
withdrawal.  
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Constraints Caused by the Regime 
Post-2004 Political Changes Influencing the Aid Environment 
Three specific developments of the post-2004 political landscape are complicating the 
operational environment for aid organisations. 
1. New leadership 
The purge of Khin Nyunt and numerous other high-ranking officials brought 
with it a radical change of the government leadership line-up. The 
International Crisis Group (ICG) underlines that “this new group has had 
much less exposure to international aid programs and is strongly nationalistic, 
inward-looking and deeply suspicious of aid agencies, which they fear may 
serve as a Trojan horse for Western political agendas” (ICG, 2006: 6). 
Especially the liberal aid agenda with its emphasis on community participation 
and bottom-up development is little understood and at times raises fears 
among the regime that aid projects may mobilise local communities against it 
(ICG, 2008: 20).  
2. Government reorganisation 
The purge also entailed a broader reorganisation of the government including 
an overhaul of the military officials, the establishment of new departments, the 
transfer of responsibilities and the relocation of the entire government to the 
new capital. These changes have created confusion at all levels of civil 
service, as government employees are unfamiliar with new responsibilities and 
surroundings. Moreover Khin Nyunt’s fate created fear, which causes many 
officials to avoid potential controversial issues, to do as little as possible and 
to stay away from foreigners (ICG, 2006: 6).  
3. Transitional politics 
The past few years have to be viewed against the backdrop of a broader 
political transition in the course of the ‘Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy’. 
While this farce did not bring any real political change, it still affected the aid 
environment. Of specific concern for aid agencies are the regime’s mass 
organisations, which undertake aggressive efforts to organise communities and 
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to promote themselves as lead agents of socio-economic development (ibid.: 
6-7).  
Government Restrictions  
Restrictions on programs and ongoing adjustments in the political and administrative 
system constrain the aid community’s ability to deliver assistance effectively, timely 
and responsibly (ICG, 2006: 5). These restrictions include:  
1. A set of new restrictive guidelines since 2006 
In February 2006 the government distributed ‘Guidelines for UN Agencies, 
International Organisations and INGOs/NGOs’ in English and Burmese. The 
more detailed Burmese version contains harsher restrictions, which, if strictly 
imposed, mean that excessive political interference and a heavy bureaucratic 
burden will hinder the timely and effective delivery of assistance (The Burma 
Campaign UK, 2006: 8). It appears that with these regulations the regime 
wants to make sure that aid activities do not threaten its political agenda. The 
guidelines foresee a new structure of committees at central, state/division and 
township levels to ‘coordinate’ (or better control) all aid activities. This also 
means more bureaucracy, delays and problems (ICG, 2006: 9). The key 
guidelines are: 
• Agencies have to choose their national staff from a list of qualified persons 
provided by the respective ministry, which directly impedes the principle of 
independence.  
• The regime has to approve all travel plans to project sites and aid staff will be 
accompanied by regime officials. 
• All foreign project funds have to be channelled through the regime-controlled 
Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and withdrawn as Foreign Exchange 
Certificates (FEC). Possible divergences in rates between FEC-Kyat and $US-
Kyat raise concerns about financial benefits to the authorities. 
• Administrative hurdles and clearance procedures concerning the approval of 
project proposals, registration of offices, appointment of staff, securing of 
visas, import of vehicles and goods, and internal travel.  
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(The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 8) 
2. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays 
The move to Naypyidaw has increased the physical and psychological 
distance between the government and aid agencies and thus resulted in less 
access to decision-makers and consequently in less opportunity for policy 
dialogue. Much more money and time has to be spent on getting permissions 
as this involves a long journey to the new capital (ICG, 2006: 7).  
In order to be able to operate aid agencies have to register with the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
government, which is a lengthy and complex process. So is the opening of 
offices. Additionally all activities have to be approved by local aid committees 
and all ministries are required to refer major decisions to the Ministry of 
Defence. Also it is difficult to obtain visas for foreign staff, who have to be 
approved by the relevant ministry(ies) first (The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 
9). Delays in getting permission for travel, visas and imports have led to the 
cancellation or postponement of activities (ICG, 2006: 8).  
3. Restricted independence 
Many international agencies are pressured to work with the USDA and other 
government organized NGOs (GONGOs). There have been numerous reports 
of GONGOs trying to get involved in and/or to take credit for international 
programs. In areas where GONGOs are strong, local NGOs face growing 
intimidation and pressure to appoint USDA or other members to their boards, 
work in partnership or even to hand over projects altogether (ibid.: 8). Yet, 
some UN agencies and INGOs cooperate with GONGOs, e.g. UNICEF or 
ICRC (Burma UN Service Office, 2003: 17).  
Also an MOU does not guarantee agencies independence concerning project 
implementation and evaluation (e.g. selection of project sites, hiring, delivery 
of materials etc.) (The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 9). In addition it pledges 
agencies to non-interference in Burma’s political and religious affairs, which 
denies them an advocacy role (Lorch, 2005: 10). Independence is also 
restricted by the regime’s constrain on research, e.g. it impedes the gathering 
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and sharing of health and development data needed for needs assessment and 
strategic planning (Melito, 2007: 24).  
4. Restricted access to beneficiaries/Travel limitations 
Access to beneficiaries in grant implementation areas is restricted, particularly 
to ethnic minority areas, and to IDP areas pretty much impossible. Lengthy 
delays are common in obtaining permission for the transportation of food 
commodities and for foreign staff to travel to project sites outside the capital. 
It took the World Food Programme (WFP) for instance more than three 
months to get access to areas of Arakan State, where people were threatened 
by major food shortages (The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 9-10). Another 
example is MSF-France, which left the country in 2005 due to constraints on 
travel and cooperation with local doctors in Karen and Mon states (ICG, 2006: 
8). UN officials stated that it has been difficult to find government 
counterparts to accompany international staff on their travels (as required by 
the new guidelines) and that these sometimes interfered in aid affairs (Melito, 
2007: 24).  
5. Forced closure of programs 
The most severe intervention has been the forced closure of entire programs or 
parts of programs. A dramatic example is the ICRC, which in 2006 was 
ordered by the regime to close all its field offices. Growing restrictions on 
nearly all its core programs followed, including prison visits (already blocked 
since 2005 after the ICRC refused the regime’s demand that representatives of 
the USDA accompany all prison visits), access to conflict-affected areas along 
the border and also basic relief operations. While other program suspensions 
were temporary, some local NGOs have been forced to terminate their 
activities altogether, mainly because they did not have the required permission 
(ICG, 2006: 8). HIV/AIDS programs have been particularly targeted by 
program closures: clinics and monasteries providing assistance to people with 
HIV have been raided and closed down, and people involved have been 
arrested, including monks and patients. Also, in 2008 Population Services 
International and Save the Children, working on HIV/AIDS, have been 
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ordered to cease health, education and counselling activities to local 
communities (Altsean-Burma, 2008: 19).  
6. Financial constraints/Corruption 
The major financial constrain is the regime’s manipulation of exchange rates. 
Agencies are required to exchange their hard (usually Western) currencies for 
local costs at official and highly overvalued exchange rates that thus provide 
implicit taxes to the government (Banki, 2009: 60). This official parallel rate 
can even be up to 40 per cent lower than the unofficial one (ICG, 2002: 23). 
However, most agencies report that they manage to circumvent this constrain 
by exchanging at the street rate, which the authorities have so far tolerated 
(The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 10).  
The authorization often required for duty-free customs clearance of imported 
aid goods is regularly delayed. Also the importation of vehicles is particularly 
problematic, e.g. exorbitant taxes or gestures of goodwill are demanded. In 
some cases the Ministry of Health laid claim to vehicles intended for aid 
agencies (e.g. of the United Nations Population Fund). In 2005 additional 
procedures for review of the procurement of medical and other supplies were 
introduced by the regime. Moreover international agencies are often charged 
rent, electricity and other commodities at inflated prices (The Burma 
Campaign UK, 2006: 11). In some cases agencies were even forced to hand 
over resources to state-controlled entities (Malseed, 2009: 381).  
7. Limited opportunity for capacity-building 
The high level of oppression of civil society and accordingly the limited 
number of community-based organizations make it difficult for agencies to 
engage in capacity building and hence to ensure that their projects are 
sustainable (The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 11). Still CBOs are key partners 
for international agencies.  
8. Excessive scrutiny by the authorities 
International aid agencies are subjected to intense scrutiny by Burmese 
authorities, which might be the reason for their reluctance to engage with the 
NLD and ethnic minorities (The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 11). 
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Surveillance has become more intense and more intrusive with regime 
officials following aid officials around, interrogating local staff and 
demanding to sit in on internal meetings. In some cases misleading 
intelligence reports to the top generals have caused crackdowns on harmless 
activities (ICG, 2006: 7).  
9. Manipulation for public relations purposes by the regime 
The Burmese government uses the presence of international agencies to 
“counter charges of human rights violations and to convey an impression of 
international legitimacy” (The Burma Campaign UK, 2006: 12). Additionally 
it is trying to improve its image as welfare provider and to increase its local 
legitimacy through GONGOs, which also try to take credit for international 
programs (ICG, 2006: 7-8).  
Factors Determining the Impact of Government Restrictions on Agencies 
The impact of government restrictions on aid agencies varies to a significant degree. 
While some programs have been severely hindered or even closed, most agencies face 
fewer problems with some even expanding their activities. The following factors 
influencing the impact of restrictions can be identified: 
1. Type of Program: 
Agencies working on human rights, community 
development/empowerment or other sensitive issues perceived as political 
agendas of Western governments have been seriously restricted in their 
access and activities. More traditional development and humanitarian 
agencies with pure service delivery programs have been less affected.  
2. Location: 
Some agencies have been pressured to relocate away from sensitive border 
areas or to focus new programs in central Burma. Access to border and 
IDP areas is problematic in general. There are exceptions to this ethnic 
discrimination though. 
3. Mode of Operation: 
The regime prefers agencies that work closely with ministries in support of 
their national plans and is suspicious of those working independently in 
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local communities. Thus the WHO or the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) for example face fewer problems than the UNDP and 
many INGOs. Also, since travel limitations affect foreign staff only, the 
impact depends on how much the agency relies on expatriates. 
4. Counterparts: 
Aid policy directions allow significant scope for interpretation and 
initiative by ministers, regional commanders and other officials at the 
implementing level. How different agencies are affected thus depends to 
some degree on their counterpart in the government and his attitude 
towards international assistance as well as his values, interests and fears. 
Personalities are especially important at the local level, where some 
officials block aid activities even if they are permitted by the government, 
while others are supportive and promote activities without official 
sanction. However, even cooperative ministers may take restrictive actions 
when under pressure from above. 
5. Level of Trust: 
Much also depends on inter-personal relations and trust, which may be 
based on the agency’s history of cooperation with the government, the 
nature of its programs and on the status and respect enjoyed by local staff 
members. Therefore, even Burma’s authoritarian and xenophobic leaders 
sometimes allow sensitive programs if they trust the operating agency.  
6. Local NGOs: 
Being subjected to the domestic legal system, local NGOs are particularly 
vulnerable to pressure and GONGOs as non-cooperation can result in 
serious personal repercussions. Still some NGOs can continue their 
activities and foreign aid officials report that there has been an expansion 
of this sector. This ambiguous picture may reflect different strength of the 
GONGOs and independent organisations in different areas (see also: Civil 
Society in Burma).  
(ICG, 2006: 9-11) 
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Cyclone Nargis: Turning a Natural Disaster into a Man-Made Catastrophe 
Cyclone Nargis, that hit the south-western coastal areas on 2 and 3 May 2008, is 
certainly the most tragic example of the extent of the regime’s constraints on 
humanitarian space. The category-four cyclone with 200km/hour winds devastated 
the Irrawaddy Delta, the industrial and commercial centre and former capital Rangoon 
as well as parts of Bago division and Mon state. A four-metre high flood surge swept 
tens of kilometres inland smashing hundreds of villages and flooding vast areas of 
agricultural land. An estimated 140,000 are dead or missing and some 2.4 million 
survivors have been severely affected losing family members, homes, food reserves, 
livestock, tools and livelihoods. Up to 800,000 people faced displacement. It will still 
take years to rehabilitate livelihoods, infrastructure and normal economic activity 
(ICG, 2008: 2-3).  
The government’s initial response was shockingly inadequate. Not only did the SPDC 
fail to warn or evacuate people, even though it knew the cyclone was approaching, it 
also failed to launch a substantial relief operation of its own (ICG, 2008: 3). As if this 
was not enough, the military regime blocked international humanitarian assistance 
efforts during the crucial first weeks and – while appealing for cash assistance – 
refused repeated requests from UN agencies and others to deliver aid directly to 
affected areas (Altsean-Burma, 2008: 19). When international aid began to trickle in, 
the SPDC insisted on strictly controlling the operation and limited access for 
international agencies and Burmese citizens wishing to help (South, 2008a: 25). In 
some cases the latter were even sentenced to prison terms if they tried to deliver aid 
without giving it to the military or spoke to foreign media (Malseed, 2009: 383). 
While many civil groups got through, others were denied permission to distribute aid 
or were harassed and intimidated by members of the USDA, which created an 
environment of fear and thus held many citizens back (ICG, 2008: 5).  
The regime’s disregard for its own people, prioritising its security and political 
agenda (constitutional referendum), caused an international outcry accusing the 
military rulers of human rights violations and a crime against humanity. Some called 
for military intervention to force access for relief aid (ibid.: 2). Finally, the 
government announced in late May that foreign aid workers would be allowed into 
cyclone-affected areas, following UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s visit. The 
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delay, however, was deadly for thousands of victims (South, 2008a: 25-26). In 
addition the regime committed a series of other human rights violations in the course 
of cyclone Nargis including the denial of access to shelter, lack of protection for 
storm victims, denial of access for the media and the use of forced labour in 
reconstruction (NCGUB, 2009: 482-499).  
The military regime restricted humanitarian space in the aftermath of the cyclone in 
the following ways: 
1. Lack of humanitarian access/Blocking of international aid: 
About a week after the cyclone, the regime announced that it was happy to 
receive the material, but the aid workers had to stay out of the country. 
From the second week it set up military checkpoints on roads into the delta 
and all access for foreigners was blocked. The junta also refused 
permission for international relief flights to go directly to the military 
airport in Bathein, which would have been much closer than Rangoon 
airport (ICG, 2008: 4-5). It repulsed a relief flight after landing in 
Rangoon and rejected the aid offer of naval vessels from the US, France 
and the UK, which were anchored just outside Burmese territorial waters 
and ready to supply the most remote areas by helicopters with tonnes of 
food and shelter. The SPDC was in no position to deliver aid to these 
remote areas due to its limited airlift capacity and the destruction of a 
significant portion of its navy’s vessels by the cyclone. Despite US and 
French naval assurances the generals stayed suspicious and negotiations 
failed. A full month after the disaster some survivors had still not been 
reached. Fearing foreign invasion the junta refused to allow much needed 
aid workers, supplies and logistical support into the country. After about 
two weeks the regime slowly began to grant aid workers visas, but insisted 
that all assistance be delivered through its own agencies, a requirement 
which it did not enforce in the end. Much aid was confiscated at the airport 
and awaited distribution by the SPDC. By mid-May restrictions on at least 
the larger UN agencies and INGOs eased, e.g. the WFP, ICRC and 
UNICEF. However, reaching outlying areas was difficult or even 
impossible in the first few weeks and the junta continued to control and 
delay aid delivery well into July. This neglect not only put the affected 
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population at serious risk but also threatened the rice harvest and with the 
delta being the ‘rice bowl of Burma’ also food security throughout the 
country (NCGUB, 2009-482).  
2. Misappropriation of foreign aid/Corruption 
Even though restrictions seemed to be easing after the first month, there 
were still political and physical roadblocks to international aid and serious 
mishandling of relief assistance by the junta. Supplies were being 
warehoused and hoarded, confiscated, stolen, sold and replaced with 
spoiled or poor-quality locally-produced Burmese products while the 
regime kept the higher quality donations (NCGUB, 2009: 486-488). 
Various reports confirm that “SPDC authorities at all levels attempted to 
profit, personally and politically, from donor generosity” (Altsean-Burma, 
2008: 19).  
For instance it was reported that high-energy biscuits from the WFP had 
been appropriated by the military, taken to a warehouse and swapped for 
lower quality local biscuits that were then distributed to the victims. Also, 
the regime distributed donated supplies - pretending to be their own - for 
publicity purposes. Generals for example were giving out aid packages 
with names of army generals, which had clearly been printed over the 
labels stating “Aid from the Kingdom of Thailand” (NCGUB, 2009: 486-
487).  
SPDC officials and soldiers confiscated supplies from survivors, charged 
them for it or told them that they had to vote ‘Yes’ in the constitutional 
referendum in order to receive aid, held raffles for relief items (Altsean-
Burma, 2008: 20) and withheld supplies specifically from Karen 
communities on ethnic grounds (KHRG, 2008). Moreover SPDC 
authorities extorted money from businesses and individuals under the 
pretence of collecting relief funds and agricultural supplies for cyclone 
victims. The regime also pocketed an estimated US$ 10 million from UN 
aid funds due to its manipulation of currency exchange rates (Altsean-
Burma, 2008: 20).  
Another factor that restricted the scope of aid agencies was limited funding. The 
government strongly objected media coverage, which would have been critical for 
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attracting donations. Thus the media focused on government restrictions and alleged 
diversions of aid, which affected public donations. This was of a particular concern 
for NGOs and also the reason for limited donations from governments (ICG, 2008: 7).  
In addition to these constraints, aid agencies struggled with the usual bureaucratic 
obstacles and guidelines described above, which caused further delays. Nevertheless 
at this point it needs to be added that also in the case of Cyclone Nargis reports of aid 
agencies on the ability to deliver aid varied significantly, e.g. MSF reported that they 
did not encounter any problems in their initial assessments and distributions. The 
government’s handling of international agencies seemed chaotic and ad hoc and thus 
the situation changed and differed from area to area, depending on the interests and 
interpretations of ministers and officials (ibid.: 4).  
Constraints Caused by International Activism 
Humanitarian space in Burma is not only restricted by the regime. Since 2004 
activism from the U.S. Congress and prodemocracy advocacy groups overseas trying 
to curtail foreign aid to Burma has revived and led to limited operational flexibility 
and funding as well as to strained relations with Burmese authorities (ICG, 2006: 11), 
following the Global Fund withdrawal. 
The Global Fund Withdrawal and its Consequences for the Aid Environment 
As the largest aid initiative in Burma, the Global Fund came under intense pressure 
from U.S.-based groups. While Fund spokespeople claimed that the 2005 withdrawal 
was motivated by technical considerations only, it is obvious that the highly 
politicised funding process and U.S. interventions were the actual root causes, even 
though the new government regulations on aid programs certainly also contributed 
their share. Following the signing of the Fund’s first grant agreement for Burma in 
August 2004, three senior U.S. Senators jointly wrote a harsh critique to its executive 
director requesting that the Fund withholds the disbursement of additional funds to 
Burma on the grounds that the SPDC is solely responsible for the humanitarian crisis. 
The Global Fund refused though and thus the Congress went after the UNDP, one of 
 85 
its partner organisations. In early 2005 an amendment to the 2006-07 Foreign 
Appropriations Bill threatened to withdraw about half of U.S. core funding to the 
agency if it failed to certify that all its programs in Burma, including those it 
administered for others such as the Global Fund, provided no benefit of any kind to 
the SPDC or government-affiliated organisations. This was a clear attempt to force 
the UNDP to withdraw as partner of the Global Fund, which probably would have led 
to the termination of its programs (ibid.: 11-12).  
In addition, U.S.-based advocacy groups led by the Open Society Institute demanded 
that the Global Fund institutes additional safeguards on its Burma programs. Thus the 
Global Fund introduced tighter restrictions on the use of its funds, which 
compromised aid effectiveness and was seen as politically motivated and an affront to 
sovereignty by the regime. At the same time - given U.S. pressure - Global Fund 
officials had reason to worry that its controversial Burma programs could be used to 
justify a cut in funding (with the U.S. being the single largest donor) and were thus 
detracting from the Fund’s broader responsibilities. Ultimately aid officials were 
frustrated by the increasing politicisation of humanitarian aid by hard liners on both 
sides and withdrew from Burma in August 2005 before the programs got underway 
(ibid.: 12-13).  
The withdrawal has had serious consequences for Burma’s aid environment: 
• Loss of Funding: 
First, it has significantly reduced the aid money available for Burma. The new 
3D Fund, which replaces the Global Fund but also the Fund for HIV/AIDS in 
Myanmar (FHAM), cannot compensate for both and therefore the total 
funding is less than before. This results in the need to allocate extra money for 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, which takes away money from programs 
in other critical sectors. 
• Operational Complications: 
Secondly, it has complicated the ability of agencies to deal with operational 
challenges. The debates about the Global Fund revived the politicisation of 
humanitarian aid by groups in the West and have led to much resentment 
within the Burmese government, which further complicates the already 
sensitive negotiations of international aid agencies. The withdrawal confirmed 
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the regime’s long-standing suspicion that aid agencies serve the political 
agenda of the U.S. and hence increases its perceived need to further control 
aid activities.  
(ibid.: 13-14) 
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Creating Humanitarian Space 
In this section I want to demonstrate how, despite Burma’s restrictive aid 
environment, humanitarian space is created through direct response strategies to the 
regime’s repression.  
I do so by giving two examples of how this space is successfully carved out: firstly, 
by Burmese civil society in exile through illegal, dangerous and incredibly 
courageous cross-border aid programs, partly with funds and support from 
international agencies. In order to illustrate how such aid projects are implemented 
and which challenges are met, I will depict a concrete case study: the Austrian non-
profit association ‚Burmahilfe – Bildung für bedrohte Minderheiten’ (‚Burma-relief – 
education for threatened minorities’) and the project ‘Karenni Mobile Clinics’. For a 
full understanding of the situation a brief background about border areas, IDPs and 
cross-border aid is given.  
Secondly, humanitarian space is created by civil society actors in Burma, where a 
quiet expansion of civil society is taking place at the local level (Dalpino, 2009: 3). 
Indigenous NGOs and community self-help organizations compensate for the lack of 
government programs and services (Clapp, 2007: 28). In fact, the failure of the 
country’s welfare state is the key factor enabling the existence and emergence of civil 
society spaces. However, civil society organisations (CSOs) have to keep up 
functional ties with members of the ruling establishment to a certain degree or even 
let themselves become partially co-opted by the latter, which gives them a double 
identity. Even though regime constraints remain considerable and do not allow for 
political expression or criticism, these CSOs successfully help to sustain basic welfare 
structures (Lorch, 2006: 30-31). Also, I will show that civilian self-help initiatives 
ensure the survival of IDP communities and fulfil an indispensible role in disaster 
relief e.g. during Cyclone Nargis. Moreover, CSOs are key partners for a successful 
and sustainable work of international aid agencies.  
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Cross-Border Aid  
The remote, mountainous areas along the borders with Thailand, Laos, China, India 
and Bangladesh are mainly populated by ethnic minorities which make up more than 
a third of the country’s population. They have long suffered from war, neglect and 
exploitation and are thus desperately poor, even though they contain most of the 
natural resources as these are plundered by the regime. The socio-economic 
conditions and the humanitarian situation are in all aspects significantly worse than in 
central parts of the country. Since 1989 ceasefires have put an end to most 
insurgencies, partly improving living conditions, but some areas, mainly along the 
Burma-Thai border, are still affected by low-intensity conflict, attacks and human 
rights abuses by the military as well as structural violence (ICG, 2004: i-13).  
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are the most vulnerable population group. Since 
the 1960s large numbers of people in the border areas have been displaced by fighting 
or forcibly relocated as part of the government’s brutal ‘four cuts’ counter-insurgency 
strategy (ibid.: 8). The exact number of IDPs is unknown but the Thailand Burma 
Border Consortium (TBBC) estimates it at least 446,000 in the rural areas of eastern 
Burma at the end of 2010, with about 73,000 being displaced alone between August 
2009 and July 2010. As this estimate is only based on data from 37 townships and 
discounts urban areas, it is likely that well over half a million people in eastern Burma 
are displaced, either living in government relocation sites or hiding from the army in 
the jungle and mountains under extremely harsh living conditions. Furthermore at 
least 3,600 civilian settlements in eastern Burma have been destructed, forcibly 
relocated or abandoned since 1996 (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2010: 
3).  
The main causes of displacement are the severe human rights abuses resulting from 
the military’s ‘four cuts’ counter-insurgency campaign. This includes forced 
relocation of civilians, who are usually given little notice before receiving relocation 
orders. Villages are attacked by the military and frequently burned down and mined in 
order to prevent return. People who refuse to leave are assumed to support armed 
opposition groups and often killed. Villagers thus flee into the jungle to avoid going 
to relocations sites, carrying infants, cooking utensils, blankets, plastic sheeting and 
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some rice. Once offensives are over, some try to return to their village and fields. 
With this strategy the regime aims to transform all areas under control of resistance 
groups – so-called ‘black’ areas – into contested ‘brown’ and finally into SPDC-
controlled ‘white’ areas. Thus, communities are moved from ‘black’ territories to 
relocation sites in ‘white’ areas (IDMC, 2010: 4). ‘Black’ areas are designated ‘free 
fire’ zones where the Burma army can kill anyone on sight (Eubank, 2008: 10). Here 
security threats are worst for IDPs, who constantly have to be prepared to flee 
(IDMC, 2010: 7).  
Most families in relocation sites are unable to cultivate their fields and are hence 
forced to forage or beg for food. Health and education services are minimal or non-
existent and demands for forced labour invariably high. Outside relocation sites, 
people are hiding from government troops, living off the land, in temporary shelters 
and under precarious conditions. Some have to move from place to place every few 
days or weeks to avoid discovery and thus lead a life on the run. Even though some 
resettlement has taken place in ceasefire areas, no or only minimal relief activities 
have been possible in the remaining conflict zones along the Thai and Indian borders 
(ICG, 2004: 9).  
Hence, the catastrophic humanitarian situation of ethnic minority areas and above all 
of the IDP population, especially acute food insecurity and serious health threats, 
highlight the urgent and desperate need for emergency relief. However, even though 
humanitarian space and the geographical reach of aid organisations working inside 
Burma expanded recently, they can only reach more stable areas such as ethnic 
ceasefire areas and government-controlled relocation sites. Yet, the scale and scope of 
this relief aid remain limited (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 20).  
Especially the conflict zones of eastern Burma cannot be reached by NGOs working 
inside the country as they are prohibited by the regime, which does not want aid 
flowing into the hands of ethnic and civil society groups, and also the areas are often 
inaccessible and too dangerous (Zaw, October 2009). Cross-border aid, though, can 
additionally access communities hiding from SPDC patrols in more unstable and 
remote areas due to its local network. Thus, the main way of reaching the most 
vulnerable displaced communities in eastern Burma will remain cross-border (The 
Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 20).  
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Cross-Border activities are primarily carried out from Thailand but also from 
Bangladesh, India and China. Since the mid-1990s Thailand-based cross-border 
groups have been operating in Karen, Karenni and Mon states. Due to security and 
local capacity constraints much less work is possible in Shan State (South, 2008c: 17).  
Although international agencies are involved in cross-border activities, they are 
mostly managed and implemented by local NGOs, ethnic nationalities’ departments 
and community-based groups in Thailand and Burma. Funding agencies have to 
cooperate with these civil society structures, which are the only way to reach remote 
and sensitive areas as well as otherwise inaccessible populations, including IDPs. This 
ensures relevance and local ownership of aid projects and also improves sustainability 
and local capacity (ICG, 2004: 20). Yet cross-border aid networks are closely 
associated with armed opposition groups as most personnel are members or affiliates 
of insurgent organisations (South, 2008c: 17). This often raises the question of 
neutrality, but, given the military regime’s lack of political legitimacy, even UN 
agencies have challenged the relevance of this principle (The Thailand Burma Border 
Consortium, 2008: 20). After all “it is only through the efforts of resistance groups - 
who provide information, communication, transportation, logistical and security 
support - that any humanitarian relief can reach those under attack” (Eubank, 2008: 
11). Cross-border assistance heavily relies on armed escorts to secure access for 
delivery. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has 
recognised that exceptional circumstances - as the conflict-affected areas of eastern 
Burma - exist where the use of armed escorts is necessary for humanitarian convoys 
and thus justified (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 20).  
Support for livelihoods is the largest sector of cross-border relief, which includes not 
only food aid for IDP camps close to the border but also cash transfers for 
communities deeper in the country. Health and education make up the other two main 
sectors, which are partly implemented through the ethnic nationalities’ own formal 
health and education departments (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 
20). Many in need of health care cross the border to Mae Sot, Thailand, and seek 
treatment at the Mae Tao clinic, established in 1988 by Dr. Cynthia Maung. Countless 
others depend on mobile medical teams that travel into high-risk areas (Zaw, October 
2009), e.g. the Backpack Health-Workers Teams (BPHWT) established in 1998 
(South, 2008b: 99). The smaller sectors of cross-border assistance are protection of 
 91 
civilians and the promotion of civil society as well as advocacy activities, human 
rights education and documentation (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 
30). Unfortunately cross-border aid is severely underfunded as I already explained, 
which limits the scope of activities.  
As cross-border aid operates in war zones and in partnership with parties to the 
conflict, donors required of cross-border groups to develop needs assessment, 
monitoring and evaluation as well as information collection and dissemination 
systems (South, 2008b: 98). In addition they developed ways in order to prevent aid 
from prolonging conflict. First, larger programmes are based on formalised 
agreements, which clarify basic humanitarian principles and respective 
responsibilities. These acknowledge that the relevant ethnic opposition party is to 
secure access, while the distribution of assistance is the independent domain of the 
local humanitarian agency. Secondly, risk and conflict impact assessments monitor 
whether there have been negative repercussions for villagers through any of the armed 
groups. Thirdly, independent field surveys have been conducted with beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries in order to assess the impact of aid programmes (The Thailand 
Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 20-21).  
‘Remote’ approaches such as cross-border aid are a common strategy in response to 
restricted humanitarian space. Addison argues that these “appear to be the best and 
most pragmatic approach to fulfilling the humanitarian imperative under highly 
constrained circumstances”. Moreover, by drawing on and developing local 
capacities, these interventions can ameliorate local participation and ownership as 
well as lay the foundation for sustainable development and democratisation. 
However, Addison sees also dangers in using local proxies, which might put 
beneficiaries and local staff in danger of violence and political persecution. Under 
authoritarian conditions like in Burma, these interventions may directly expose local 
civil society actors to oppression (Addison, 2008).  
Much suspicion, tension and debate between agencies working in-country and cross-
border highlight the need for greater confidence building, coordination and 
information sharing in order to overcome ongoing funding, political and logistical 
constraints (The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, 2008: 21).  
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Case Study: The Austrian non-profit Association ‘Burmahilfe’ and the Project 
‘Karenni Mobile Clinics’ 
The Austrian non-profit association ‚Burmahilfe – Bildung für bedrohte 
Minderheiten’ (‚Burma-relief – education for threatened minorities’) was founded in 
2006 by Gabriele Schaumberger, who frequently travels to Mae Hong Son in the 
refugee areas of northern Thailand. The organisation cooperates directly with Karenni 
organisations and supports a variety of their projects in the refugee areas as well as 
cross-border aid projects into the war zones of Karenni state, e.g. mobile clinics. 
Burmahilfe targets most of its activities at IDPs being the most vulnerable group,  
which is only possible through the trustful collaboration with camp-based community 
structures reaching into IDP areas. In addition it organises all kinds of events in 
Vienna for awareness and fundraising purposes. 
The Origin of the Association 
Gabriele Schaumberger, chairwoman of Burmahilfe, travelled and worked in many 
European countries before returning to Vienna in 2001. 25 years of intercultural 
experience make her a competent mediator between cultures (Schaumberger, 2007 - 
2010).  
Her main concern is to assist one of the most threatened ethnic groups of Burma, the 
Karenni, who live in the Burmese border areas to Thailand. Above all she wants to 
provide much needed education. Schaumberger gained a lot of on-site experience in 
refugee work, amongst others as teacher in educational institutions inside and outside 
the refugee camps in northern Thailand. Her contacts to leaders of the democracy 
movement in exile contributed to a deeper understanding of the very complex 
political situation in Burma. Operating exclusively through Karenni grassroots 
structures, she wants to convey and apply her insight of the past years (ibid.).  
Schaumberger’s first Asia trip in 1996 took her to a Karenni refugee camp in the 
mountains close to Mae Hong Son. Touched by the simplicity and warmth of the 
people, she formed many long-lasting friendships. During her follwing visits a 
committed Karenni introduced her to the structures of the democracy movement in 
exile as well as the grassroots organisations. Schaumberger taught English in a camp, 
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gave painting classes to children and started a waste awareness campaign in a school, 
which resulted in the introduction of collecting points for old batteries (ibid.).  
After a break of a few years, Schaumberger returned at the beginning of 2005 in order 
to establish a school system in a Karenni safehouse in the border town of Mae 
Sariang. Her insight in the interaction with Karenni is mainly based on the 
experiences made during this time. In Mae Hong Son she resumed contact to the 
leaders in exile and thereby became acquainted with the local situation and other 
Karenni structures. In summer 2005 she began with her work in Austria. For more 
efficiency she joined the South Tyrolean organisation ‘Helfen ohne Grenzen’ (‘help 
without frontiers’) in fall and founded its field office in Vienna. Benno Röggla, the 
dedicated founder and chairman of ‘Helfen ohne Grenzen’, encouraged 
Schaumberger’s work and supported her with his knowledge. Due to the geographical 
distance as well as differing aims, however, she decided to found her own association 
in summer 2006 (ibid.).  
Vision / Mission Statement 
Burmahilfe is primarily committed to education as a sustainable ressource/mean for 
the self-contained/autonomous survival of threatened peoples. In terms of an 
intercultural dialogue knowledge of and respect for the local culture is seen as the 
most important precondition for successful collaboration. With the so acquainted trust 
knowledge can be imparted in an appropriate, understandable form/way. All other 
approaches have proven to be counterproductive or even harmful (ibid.).  
The association also encourages the remembrance and appreciation of our own 
cultural roots, which enables a fruitful intercultural dialogue in the first place (ibid.). 
Burmahilfe is convinced that a peaceful co-existence of all cultures is possible and 
thus wants to contribute to a pacific solution for Burma in the following ways: 
• Humanitarian emergency aid through the provision of food and medical 
supplies; 
• Education for threatened ethnic groups in order to pave the way to 
democracy and a peaceful world; 
• Revival of traditional knowledge: the recognition of cultural variety as 
creative potential; 
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• Sustainable income maintenance through the development/advance of already 
existing resources (e.g. traditional handcraft); 
• Protection of our planet and natural resources (e.g. the supplementation of 
traditional agriculture with gentle, sustainable and modern technology); 
• Self-help assistance: Strengthening of self-confidence and supporting the 
passing on of cultural heritage (ibid.); 
Approach and Way of Working 
Burmahilfe stands out due to the involvement of the beneficiaries in all the project 
phases, from planning to implementation. The association cooperates with respected 
members of the Karenni ethnic group on the basis of trust and respect, which ensures 
a multiple effect (ibid.).  
In collaboration with CBOs education projects are supported, which – under 
consideration of the traumatisation of the people – are targeted at reestablishing their 
cultural identity and self-esteem. Burmahilfe is only geared to already existing 
projects of the beneficiaries. Together with those the real needs are assessed and the 
people themselves develop and implement their own ideas (ibid.).  
The organisation focuses on education with respect for the cultural identity, critical 
thinking, means of communication (PC, internet), raising awareness through passing 
on the cultural heritage as well as reports on human rights abuses (ibid.).  
Partners 
Burmahilfe cooperates only with civil society structures of the Karenni ethnic group 
in Mae Hong Son Province. The association collaborates directly with the leaders of 
CBOs and supports their already existing projects and ideas. On the one hand there 
are migrants who established their own organisations and networks such as the 
‘Ethnic Migrant Families Society’, one of Burmahilfe’s main partners. On the other 
hand the association works closely with camp-based Karenni departments. For the 
project ‘Karenni Mobile Clinics’ for instance Burmahilfe’s partner organisation is the 
‘Karenni Health Department’ (KnHD), a volunteer organization that oversees health 
services in the Karenni refugee camps in Mae Hong Son. Other partner organisations 
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include the Karenni IDP Committee, the Karenni Education Department (KnED) and 
the Karenni State Youth (ibid.).  
Projects and Activities  
Burmahilfe operates in Austria, mainly Vienna, as well as in Northern Thailand, Mae 
Hong Son Province. 
With various fundraising, awareness raising and public relations activities in Vienna, 
Burmahilfe not only wants to highlight the grievances in Burma but also aims to 
enhance cross-cultural dialogue and appreciation as well as encourage the appraisal of 
our own cultural roots and assets, e.g. through intercultural events with typical 
Austrian music. Activities in Vienna include many slide shows, lectures, panel 
discussions, informative events, film screenings, beneficial concerts and other 
fundraising campaigns. In addition Gabriele Schaumberger organized the visit of the 
Burmese government in exile (NCGUB) in Vienna in 2006 including a press 
conference and appointments with Austrian politicians. She also supported the 
concept preparation and implementation of the documentary film ‘The Refugee Show 
- an Asylum in Tourism’ about Karenni refugees in Mae Hong Son Province in 2007 
(ibid.).  
Besides its public relations activities in Vienna, Burmahilfe supports projects in the 
two refugee camps and of the migrant community in Mae Hong Son as well as in the 
IDP areas of Karenni State inside Burma, of which I will give only a few examples. 
Indirect Cross-Border Aid 
The Project ‚New Life’ is aimed at building capacity for the CBOs giving cross-
border aid in regards to a future cooperation with Western NGOs. In a workshop 
adolescents are taught all necessary skills in order to be able to run the camp offices. 
The objective is the self-contained maintenance of the administrative structures, 
which will be strengthened so that they can work independently and fulfill donor 
requirements. The three-month pilot project was funded by ‘Caritas Austria’ in 2009. 
The ADA supported the next training in 2010, when Schaumberger herself monitored 
the project and taught amongst others on site. The trainees were prepared to work for 
the CBOs active in cross-border aid and are potential partners for Burmahilfe. As 
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respect and trust have been established during the training, cooperation is fruitful. At 
present, the needs assessment for the next training is underway (ibid.).  
Direct Cross-Border Aid 
Burmahilfe supports various projects in the IDP areas inside Burma, for instance the 
training of teachers. In this project of the ‘Karenni Education Department’ (KnED) a 
group of teachers from the camp schools go into the war zones escorted by resistance 
troops and hold workshops for about a week in order to pass on teaching methods and 
materials. Burmahilfe supports these IDP schools through financing wages of teachers 
(ibid.).  
Similarly the ‘Karenni Social and Welfare Development Committee’ (KSWDC) holds 
human rights workshops in several villages with trainers from the camps, who 
strengthen the people’s awareness for their rights with practical exercises. During 
these workshops trust is built and information exchanged. They also serve the purpose 
of collecting data about human rights abuses and of assessing needs regarding health 
care and education (ibid.).  
At the moment the project ‘Karenni Mobile Clinics’ is running, which will be dealt 
with in the following chapter.  
Project: Karenni Mobile Clinics 
Many refugees living in the refugee camps in Thailand have realized the need of 
extending support to their families left behind in the war zones. They started to 
organize themselves in teams that deliver medical care into these areas. Throughout 
the years they have been trained by INGOs such as MSF and others. Cooperation with 
other ethnic groups (Karen, Shan) and Karenni organizations operating along the 
Thai-Burma-border dealing with the same problems has resulted in a good network, 
each helping out the other. As the Mobile Clinic Teams have been continuously 
visiting target areas for many years now, respect and trust has built up with 
communities. Yet, it is only refugees themselves who are able to deal with the 
hardships of such trips, which include not only the long and demanding journey itself 
but also great risks such as landmines, Burmese army troops, and malaria 
(Schaumberger, 2011b: 3).  
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Burmahilfe wants to support this initiative and currently supports the project ‘Karenni 
Mobile Clinics’, which started in January 2011 and will be completed in June 2011, in 
cooperation with the ‘Karenni Health Department’ (KnHD) and with funds of ‘Caritas 
Austria’. The overall objective of the project is to improve the health situation of the 
IDP and rural population of Karenni State with no or limited access to health care 
through emergency relief and trainings aimed at providing knowledge about basic 
health care to enable the target group to deal with minor diseases on their own. There 
are three IDP clinics in areas labelled as ‘black zones’ where most people hide in the 
jungle. A fourth clinic was set up in a very isolated rural area (ibid.: 3-4). For security 
reasons the names of places cannot be revealed.  
Situational Background: Karenni State  
 
Figure 3: Map of Karenni State21 
Karenni State (capital: Loikaw) is the smallest of the seven ethnic states and regarded 
as one of the least accessible and poorest areas in the Union of Burma. Over half a 
century of conflict and neglect has left Karenni State lacking in basic infrastructure, 
                                                
21 KARENNI HOMELAND. 2005a. Karenni State (Kayah State) 
http://www.karennihomeland.com/ArticleArticle.php?ContentID=57. 
 98 
with poor transport and communication links, inadequate health care, widespread 
illiteracy and little or no socio-economic development. Mortality rates from 
malnutrition are high, treatable illnesses prevalent and the number of schools, teachers 
and students the lowest in all of Burma. The Burma Military Government does not 
allow foreigners to travel to Karenni State (Karenni Homeland, 2005b).  
Karenni State is a religious and ethnically diverse territory with about 246,000 
inhabitants and 14 ethnic groups. The following groups are mentioned in the 1983 
census: Kayah, Geko (Gaykho), Geba (Gaybar), Padaung/Kayan, Bres, Manu-Manaus 
(Manumanao), Yintale, Yinbaw, Bwe, Paku, Shan and Pao. Other ethnic, though non-
native groups living in the state are: Kachin, Karen, Chin, Burmese, Mon, Rakhine, 
Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Nepalese. The main ethnic tribes can be 
classified under the heading ‘Karen’. It is believed that they migrated into the area 
from Mongolia around 3000 years ago (ibid.). 
The first language for all these groups is their own individual mother tongue. 
Additionally the Kayah (Karenni) language is widely spoken as a language of unity, 
though the teaching of ethnic languages is forbidden in schools. Amongst those with 
some state education Burmese is also spoken (ibid.). 
Two thirds of the population is displaced. Karenni State has the highest presence of 
Burmese military in their territory. Areas of non cease-fire groups are target of ethnic 
cleansing. Villages are burnt down, women are gang raped, men used as porters, and 
landmines laid after the destruction of villages. Around 50.000 Karenni live on the 
run from Burmese military, in the jungle, without access to clean water, medication or 
education, for already more than 20 years (Schaumberger, 2011b: 2).  
Since 1985, when the Burmese military cracked down hard on ethnic areas, they 
started to seek refuge on the border and have since then been allowed to stay on Thai 
territory. The many small settlements have been consolidated into two big camps near 
the Thai-Burma-Border outside Mae Hong Son in 2003. Camp 1 shelters a population 
of 20.000, while Camp 2 holds 5.000 refugees – without official refugee status. The 
EC calls them ‘uprooted peoples’, while for Thailand they are “people fleeing from 
fighting, temporarily settling on Thai soil.” Thai authorities allow the refugees to stay, 
as long as they do not leave the camps, where there is no privacy, electricity or any 
means of communication and a curfew applies after 9 pm. Some NGOs are allowed to 
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work inside the camps, but have to leave at nightfall. For all others access is denied 
since 2003 (ibid.: 2).  
The Livelihood and Health Situation in IDP and Rural Areas of Karenni State 
Large parts of Karenni State are labeled as ‘black areas’ and are thus ‘free fire zones’. 
Here the population is constantly on the run, as government troops will shoot anybody 
in sight, including women and children. They can be arrested, tortured, forced to 
move to relocation sites or dispossessed at any time. In addition, the military 
government neglects health care, education, development, and livelihood (ibid.: 2-3).  
Political instability and bad weather also contribute to survival hardships. The 
presence of different political and armed groups in the region leads to suffering of 
mental stress, contact fear and insecurity, which contribute to a worsening health. Due 
to mistreatment, torture, harassment and forced labor from different armed groups, no 
one wants to be the village head. Hence some villages operate a rotation system for 
the position, where everyone has to take turns to be village head for a period between 
one month and one year (ibid.: 3).  
Karenni peoples have maintained their traditional lifestyle in autonomous 
communities until the arrival of Burmese military. Traditional medicinal knowledge, 
which has been applied throughout generations, was lost first. After almost 30 years 
on the run in an ever-changing environment, IDP communities are mainly in search of 
food and safe shelter. In IDP areas throughout the years the Malaria rate has gone up 
from 10% to 90%. Diseases unknown to the community have appeared, many of them 
caused by malnutrition, polluted water and mental stress. Often the reason for a 
sudden death is unknown. The mortality rate of children here is the highest in all of 
Burma (ibid.: 3).  
Camp-based CBOs giving Cross-Border Assistance 
The refugees in Thailand have organized themselves and formed CBOs, who take 
care of all needed infrastructure in the camps. Some of these CBOs receive support 
from INGOs, but these do not have the possibility to reach out into the war zones 
inside the country. Only established CBOs know the whereabouts of IDP 
communities and have the means and courage to deliver aid into these areas. Many of 
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their members left family behind. The main core areas of these CBOs are education, 
health care and environmental awareness raising (ibid.: 2).  
The lack of contact and knowledge about how to deal with the International 
Community (communication, language, office skills etc.) results in a shortage of 
funding for essential projects for this most vulnerable group inside the country. A 
resettlement program, which has been going on for the past two years, has also 
resulted in a ‘brain drain’ and set the camp community back many years. ‘Caritas 
Austria’ has already supported the above-mentioned capacity building training ‘New 
Life’ in 2009 to replace missing staff. A follow up training was held in 2010, 
supported by ADA. Some former participants work with the ‘Mobile Clinics’ today 
and ensure the ongoing of this project (ibid.: 2). 
 
Partner Organisation: Karenni Health Department (KnHD) 
The KnHD is a volunteer organization that oversees health services in the Karenni 
refugee camps in Mae Hong Son. It was formed in 1989 in order to assist INGOs in 
delivering medical aid to the camp population. The ‘International Relief Committee’ 
(IRC) has since then taken over refugee health care, which consists of training staff 
and giving medical support to the camp clinics. The KnHD is in charge of running 
five clinics and at present has 300 staff members, all of which are refugees. In 2008 
the first clinic was set up in IDP areas with the aid of the ‘Burma Relief Committee’ 
(BRC). Constant changes in the structure of the KnHD have finally put dedicated 
activists in charge, who however, do not have the skills to apply for funds. Thus 
‘Burmahilfe’ serves as mediator between the KnHD and ‘Caritas Austria’ in this case 
(ibid.: 6).  
Beneficiaries 
The target group is the IDP population of Karenni State, living in ‘free fire’ zones, as 
well as the rural population in designated areas, who has no or very limited access to 
health care. The number of beneficiaries makes up 7000 people and 1032 families. In 
addition 5000 indirect beneficiaries will be reached. Due to close cooperation with 
village leaders, who secretly send committed community members to offered 
trainings, extended families and villagers as well as all members of the visited IDP 
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communities will benefit from the project too, as they will be able to deal with minor 
diseases themselves (ibid.: 1-2). 
The IDP population of Karenni State is the most vulnerable group that has no access 
to health care and education. On the run for already more than 20 years, the number 
of minor and actually curable diseases has risen. Deforestation and climate change 
have led to draughts and lack of water in most villages located on hillsides, which has 
made traditional life almost impossible. Lack of clean water is the main source of 
diseases. Also poor rural communities living in other areas suffer from similar 
problems. Sometimes available health services are either too expensive, inaccessible 
or simply useless as self-proclaimed ‘doctors’ financially exploit their patients 
without prospect of cure. Moreover fake medicines made in China are being used. By 
extending medical emergency relief to these groups, hope and trust will help them to 
redevelop self-esteem and reduce their suffering (ibid.: 3).  
Project Purpose 
1. To deliver emergency health care (including amputations); 
2. To reduce mortality rate of mothers and children; 
3. To educate the communities about basic health care; 
4. To give workshops about mine awareness raising, traditional birth assistance 
and human rights; 
5. To report on human rights abuses; 
6. To train community health workers in affected areas; 
7. To build trust with traumatized communities; 
(ibid.: 4) 
Expected Results 
1. Lives will be saved; 
2. Mothers will know how to deal with childbirth and newborn babies; 
3. Communities will be able to deal with minor diseases on their own; 
4. Less casualties from landmines and childbirth; 
5. Drop in human rights abuses; 
6. Specially trained health worker volunteers will be able to assist with curing 
minor diseases; 
7. Trust and hope will have strengthened communities (ibid.: 4); 
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Activities 
1. Mobile teams are set up  
At the border camp near Mae Hong Son, the KnHD selects and trains medics 
with the support of INGOs (MSF, International Rescue Committee). As there 
are four clinics to visit, four teams are formed. Due to the lack of staff caused 
by the resettlement program, the number of team members had to be reduced 
from four to three. Each team consists of a medic in charge, a community 
health worker and a medic responsible for reproductive and child health. 
Medics prepare their own backpack, including emergency medicine for 
treating villagers on their way. Each pack weighs 15 kilos. Usually the teams 
travel together with other cross-border groups entering the war zones and are 
escorted by armed groups for security reasons. Medicine is sent on different 
routes from clinic teams due to security risks. At present teams stay inside 
Burma for six months in order to keep travel costs low and clinics maintained.     
2. Teams travel to IDP areas and clinics 
Up to the border, the four teams travel by car, which have to be rented. Travel 
costs for one car at present is 125 Euro (5.000 Thai Baht). From the border 
down to the Salween River the journey starts on foot. Bamboo rafts are built 
for crossing the Salween River, which is one of the most dangerous parts of 
the journey. After the crossing, the four groups part and head into different 
directions to their target areas. Depending on weather conditions and Burmese 
troop movements, it can take weeks to reach the clinics. On the way, the teams 
set up temporary clinics in the jungle to serve the IDP communities they meet 
on their way. These only consist of plastic sheets to protect medicine and 
patients from sun and rain. If the security situation allows, health care 
trainings are held in order to strengthen these traumatized communities. 
3. Clinics are maintained  
Altogether four clinics have been set up in the past years – three of them in 
IDP areas (black/free fire zones), and one in a rural area. The IDP clinics are 
simple bamboo structures, while the clinic near Loikaw is made of wood. IDP 
clinics are at high risk of having to move any time and thus demand an 
emergency evacuation strategy in case of Burmese army attacks. In IDP areas 
people gather soon after the arrival of the teams. In rural Karenni State teams 
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must stay out of the villages for security reasons. The infrastructure of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Karenni State has proven to be a helpful link 
between the relief teams from the border and the communities inside. A team 
member contacts the village priest who then passes on word about the arrival 
of the teams.  
4. Trust building with communities 
Upon their arrival, the teams contact community leaders to discuss the general 
and the health situation. According to the needs actions are taken. Each clinic 
keeps case studies and does a follow up. Patients unable to travel are visited at 
home, up to two-day walks from the clinics. 
5. Patients are treated 
The most common diseases are malaria, diarrhea, skin diseases, worms, eye 
problems, pulmonary tuberculosis (TB), HIV and injuries (often caused by the 
Burmese military – landmines, forced labour etc.). Malnutrition and lack of 
clean water are the main sources of sickness. Medicines are purchased in 
Bangkok to make sure they are not fake. Patients are checked and treated. As 
the equipment is very basic, some sicknesses are unidentified and cannot be 
cured. The teams also conduct children nutrition checks as seven out of ten 
children are malnourished and have worms. Vitamins and worm tablets are 
handed out. All data available is collected. According to team members many 
lives are saved on each trip and minor diseases that could have been avoided 
are prevalent.  
6. Community education 
Additional to the treatment with pharmaceutical products, the use of local 
resources and traditional medicine is encouraged. Hence Burmahilfe supports 
a research in traditional medicine. Trainings to empower the communities 
have to be held in secret: 
• Mine awareness raising education: 
IDP areas are heavily landmined resulting in lots of injuries. In this 
workshop people are taught how to avoid mines, how to destroy them 
and in case of an injury how to deal with it. 
• Community health worker education: 
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In this two-day training the participants from either IDP or village 
communities is taught how to deal with simple diseases.  
• Traditional Child Birth Assistance (TBA): 
In this three-day training the use of herbal medicine as well as childcare 
are taught. At the end of the training vitamin B-pills and a starting kit are 
handed out to each participant. 
7. Reporting human rights abuses 
Workshops about human rights – unknown to these people – are aimed at 
raising self-esteem and at establishing a network to report human rights abuses 
in villages. Building trust with communities helps to smash the ‘divide and 
rule’ policy of the government, which gives false information to different 
ethnic and religious groups and thus sows distrust. 
8. Monitoring and documentation 
The teams consult with community leaders and make sure they look after the 
clinics through a volunteer until the return of the teams. The team leader is 
also responsible for collecting data (patients records, case studies, photos) 
needed for a detailed documentation. Information is passed onto the base on 
the border through walkie-talkies and mobile phones.  
9. Returning ‘home’ 
The teams return to their base in the camp after six months in order to deliver 
information, receive further trainings if available and prepare for the next trip 
– if funding is guaranteed. As this project cannot be monitored from outside 
due to security reasons, finding funds is difficult.  
(ibid.: 4-6) 
Difficulties encountered 
• After the elections in November 2010, the Burmese government increased 
troops movements in most ethnic areas, resulting from the resistance of most 
ethnic groups to surrender their arms despite increasing pressure. Heavy 
fighting has been going on since then, also around the target area. Due to 
increased troop movement travelling has become more difficult, especially 
river and road crossings. 
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• As clinics are located in black areas, they are in danger of being discovered. 
Medics and patients labelled as rebels would get shot on sight and medicine 
would be lost. 
• The KnHD is run by refugees from IDP areas, who have only basic education, 
English skills are rare and contact to the outside world is only possible through 
Internet as they are restricted to camp life. Also monitoring is difficult. Thus 
finding funds has been challenging for the Karenni. Since the establishment of 
cross-border aid small funds from various sources helped to keep this 
important project going. However, funding happens very inconsistently and as 
a result planning ahead is almost impossible.   
• Due to changing weather conditions (worldwide climate change) the storage 
of medicine is difficult.  
• Environmental changes have made traditional life impossible as water is 
polluted and the main source for curable diseases. On each trip new diseases 
are registered. As the medics are trained to treat only known diseases, they 
must be prepared (training, medical supply) for their next field trip. 
• The Roman Catholic Church has started to play a major role in supporting the 
clinics. However, aid given through priests must be kept secret from 
authorities. Priests support by involving the community in the maintenance of 
clinics, pass on word about their whereabouts and help to organize trainings. 
(Schaumberger, 2011a: 3) 
Civil Society in Burma 
Besides the remarkable efforts of aid organisations in-country and most notably 
Burmese civil society structures in exile (e.g. cross-border aid), civil society in Burma 
itself developed various strategies and self-help initiatives in order to improve their 
living conditions and thus manage to carve out some humanitarian space despite very 
restrictive and repressive measures by the regime. 
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The military sets up more and more bases in rural areas throughout the country, 
through which power is radiated over the surrounding villages, “imposing restrictions 
on the activities and movements of civilians and extorting resources, crops, and 
labour, using human rights abuses as mechanisms of control” (Malseed, 2009: 370). 
At this point it is crucial to mention that civilians are not unintended victims and 
displacement not a side effect of a civil war as it is often misrepresented. Rather, 
civilians are the deliberate targets of SPDC military campaigns (Phan and Hull, 2008: 
18) and there are usually not even armed resistance forces around when villages are 
attacked and destroyed (Malseed, 2009: 371).  
The regime actively suppresses the emergence of civil society through pervasive 
military surveillance and laws, which for instance forbid that more than five people 
hold a public meeting without government authorization. Hence the ability of 
civilians to form community organizations is strictly limited (Clapp, 2007: 26-27) and 
so are the legal ways of expression (see also: Chapter 3).  
The state’s poor governance and coercive control as well as poverty, however, have 
fostered, as a reaction, resilient ties of horizontal solidarity, a common survival 
strategy of Third World societies. The people’s power, the traditional close-knit 
family togetherness and community spirit, was evident during Burma’s historical 
mass protests but also typify the quieter routines of daily life. Despite severe poverty, 
strong social networks and family ties result in mutual aid for collective survival. 
People respond to community needs by launching their own development and relief 
programs (Seekins, 2009: 728-729). Yet, this often involves pervasive client-patron 
arrangements as Seekins describes: “The SPDC’s failure (or unwillingness) to 
alleviate the poverty of most Myanmar people and their frequent resort to repressive 
measures have strengthened this horizontal solidarity, a kind of dialectical opposition 
in which the top-down power of the state is counterbalanced by the resilience of local 
networks, which frequently act defensively against the state but sometimes cooperate 
with its agents: the situation is complex as regards people’s attitudes toward 
individuals connected with the regime, since officials, including military officers, can 
act as (supposedly benevolent) patrons to ordinary citizens who are their clients” 
(Seekins, 2009: 730). Civilians often depend on these state-society relations as a 
survival strategy (ibid.: 730).  
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In order to depict how Burmese civil society successfully creates humanitarian space 
under authoritarian rule, I will mainly refer to Jasmin Lorch’s study “Civil Society 
under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Myanmar”.  
While it is often assumed that the strong military regime of Burma does not allow for 
any scope of action at all, Lorch argues that spaces for civil society actors do exist 
within three specific areas: “firstly, within the ambit of changes within the state itself; 
secondly, in various sectors of the weak welfare state; and thirdly, within some of the 
negotiated spaces of relative ethnic autonomy in ceasefire areas. While these rooms 
for manoeuvre are always relational to the authoritarian nature of the military regime, 
civil society actors use every space available in order to tackle the welfare needs of 
their respective communities” (Lorch, 2006: 5).  
Civil Society Emerging from within the State and Governmentally Organised 
NGOs (GONGOs) 
• Welfare activities of government officials: 
Some retired officials are frustrated with the state’s weak performance and 
have thus sought alternative ways for organising and influencing political 
developments. For example, they are active in food security, health, 
development and environment protection. Some found NGOs, which maintain 
functional ties and closely cooperate with the government. These strong 
linkages indicate that there is an ample grey zone between civil society and 
regime structures. Others engage in more informal ways, e.g. Buddhist charity. 
In private government officials often participate in charity as an essential part 
of their belief system. This varies from supporting welfare institutions such as 
hospitals to more informal customs such as alms-giving (ibid.: 17-18).  
• Emancipating segments of GONGOs: 
Certain sub-groups of GONGOs or individuals within them are genuinely 
interested in delivering good welfare services, but see no other way of doing 
so than by using government-sponsored channels. However some of them test 
the limits of state control and have managed to emancipate to a certain degree 
by trying to enlarge their political scope of action (ibid.: 18).  
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Room for Manoeuvre for Civil Society in the Welfare Sector 
The Burmese government is weak regarding the core function of providing for the 
welfare of the population, which is also part of a deliberate funding strategy of the 
regime. This entails gaps in the welfare system that are conducive to the emergence of 
civil society, whose actors are able to move into the emerging spaces and to take over 
central functions of the welfare state. Consequently some room for manoeuvre exists 
for civil society actors in the welfare sector. The regime tolerates certain civil society 
activities where it is unable or unwilling to deal with the tremendous welfare needs 
itself. Local self-help groups, which take over welfare functions regarding health 
issues, education and the provision of food, are a rather new phenomenon but their 
number is steadily growing. These initiatives, often intertwined with religious aims, 
vary in their degree of formality and organisation from traditional and unregistered 
village associations such as funeral societies to registered NGOs up to a national 
level. While most of these groups are active in mere service delivery, some have 
managed to extend their measures to include capacity building and empowerment, 
which guarantees the sustainability of their projects (ibid.: 19-21).  
• Community-based organisations (CBOs) providing for humanitarian self-help 
and local infrastructure: 
Local self-help groups fulfil important welfare tasks regarding basic needs 
such as food and health care as well as small infrastructure projects on a 
village level e.g. the construction of wells, which are mostly funded by 
donations from community members. CBOs are usually problem-orientated 
and have an informal organisational structure. They often lack the skills to 
write project proposals and - fearing repressions by the regime - are reluctant 
to cooperate with international organisations. In Buddhist communities the 
local temples and pagodas often provide the social space for communities to 
participate in activities as well as the humanitarian space by maintaining rice 
associations and organising festivals that serve distributive functions (ibid.: 
21).  
• Funeral Help Associations – Funeral Services for the poor:  
These associations organise and finance funerals for poor people on the basis 
of private donations and the voluntary commitment of their members. While 
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some grew out of traditional village associations and thus have an informal 
organisational structure, others are registered NGOs and operate in large cities 
such as the ‘Free Funeral Service Association’ that has even been supported 
by famous local artists. The government tolerates these organisations, as their 
work is absolutely indispensable and apolitical (ibid.: 21-22).  
• Parent-teacher associations (PTAs) provide basic educational facilities:  
These voluntary groups consist of parents and schoolteachers and in many 
towns and regions are the only actors to provide the foundations for basic 
education as the government spends just about one per cent of its total budget 
on education. PTAs collect money for textbooks and take care of the basic 
maintenance of school buildings. They have been mushrooming in recent 
years and some even managed to form networks among each other and to 
establish contacts with international organisations that support them 
financially and make them familiar with modern teaching methods (ibid.: 22).  
• The Sangha and monastic education:  
Monastic education has always been crucial in Burma as a means of providing 
not only the novices but also ordinary citizens with basic education. In some 
rural areas monasteries are actually the only educational institutions that exist. 
Monastic education centres are free or at least charge less than state schools. 
Some specifically target street children and orphans and also provide them 
with accommodation and food. While most monastic schools offer primary 
education, some also teach at a higher level. They are relatively free to follow 
their own curriculum as long as they do not criticise the regime. Still, monastic 
students have to pass government exams for getting an officially recognised 
degree. Even though most centres provide their services regardless of race and 
religion, education is conducted in accordance with Buddhist values and 
principles. Monastic schools vary both in the degree to which they are co-
opted by the government and in size, including small local Buddhist groups as 
well as large education centres with a wide range of learning opportunities. 
Their room for manoeuvre, especially for the latter, is directly dependent on 
personal linkages of the monks with the ruling establishment, which grants 
them independence and protection from repressions. Similar education and 
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welfare projects are maintained by the Muslim, Hindu and Christian minorities 
(ibid.: 23-24).  
Negotiated Room for Manoeuvre for Civil Society in Ceasefire Areas 
Similarly some scope of action for civil society exists in certain ceasefire areas with a 
degree of ethnic autonomy. Even though most ceasefire agreements were motivated 
by mere economic interests of the military, they have led to the emergence or 
enlargement of humanitarian spaces for civil society. According to Lorch this room 
for manoeuvre depends on two factors: “firstly, the military strength of the ethnic 
resistance party at the time of the ceasefire agreement determines the degree of 
autonomy that it is granted; and secondly, the political character and motivation of the 
respective ethnic party are also crucial because not all minority groups allow the 
emergent spaces of autonomy to be occupied by civil society actors” (ibid.: 24). As 
the regime is unable or unwilling to tackle the enormous underdevelopment of these 
minority areas and hence fears that the armed resistance groups will call off the 
ceasefires due to economic frustration, it allows civil society actors to conduct 
humanitarian projects in the sectors of development, culture, education and welfare. 
Again the initiatives vary in their degree of formality and organisation (ibid.: 24-25).  
• Informal Development Projects:  
Some informal initiatives and small NGOs at the local level operate projects in 
basic development and reconstruction of war-torn communities. These are 
mostly issue-orientated and highly decentralised (ibid.: 25).  
• Culture and Literature Committees and their role in education:  
In recent years various ethnic parties (e.g. Chin, Karen, Mon and Shan) have 
been able to issue publications in their local languages and consequently civil 
society initiatives in the sectors of culture and literature have been 
mushrooming. These groups have also pioneered alternative community 
education approaches and offer for instance language courses for children in 
their own ethnic tongues (ibid.: 25-26). However, many other ethnic groups do 
not enjoy this kind of freedom (see also: chapter 3).  
• Christian churches and their role in education and development:  
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In predominantly Christian areas it is mostly the churches and church-related 
organisations that take over the state’s welfare role and address the 
fundamental needs of the population such as education, health and food. As 
Christian church leaders have contacts to churches abroad and are thus 
familiar with Western developmental approaches, the co-ordination between 
local associations and INGOs usually works quite well. In addition the 
sophisticated organisational structure of many congregations (e.g. youth and 
women’s groups) facilitate the targeted implementation of projects. National 
network structures, such as the Myanmar Council of Churches or the 
Myanmar Baptist Convention, run various developmental as well as 
humanitarian and disaster relief programmes. Also they conduct poppy crop 
substitution and HIV/AIDS projects in remote minority areas. Some 
educational programmes finance scholarships for gifted students to study 
abroad. Christian educational institutions are relatively free to formulate their 
curriculum as long as they refrain from criticising the regime. However, big 
church networks rely on their contacts with members of the ruling 
establishment, which curtails their independence but at the same time also 
guarantees them some protection and autonomy. Still the regime tolerates 
Christian projects particularly in ethnic minority areas as they fulfil the 
welfare function not met by the state (ibid.: 26-27).  
• The Metta Development Foundation and the Shalom Foundation:  
The Metta Development Foundation, operating projects in sustainable 
community development, and the Shalom Foundation, active in peace 
building, are registered NGOs in Kachin State, that have become popular with 
international experts and aid workers due to their relative independence and 
community-based approach to reconstructing war-torn areas. Both 
organisations grew out of the ceasefire and are conceded a certain degree of 
action by both the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the regime. 
Even though they are not countrywide institutions, they sometimes act as 
facilitators for other associations and NGOs. Both have to keep up functional 
ties with the regime but also serve as protective umbrellas for smaller NGOs 
(ibid.: 28-29).  
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IDP Self-Help Initiatives 
A common external misrepresentation is one, which portrays “villagers as helpless 
‘victims’ who lack the knowledge and means to address their own needs” (Phan and 
Hull, 2008: 19). However, they have proven to be innovative and courageous in 
responding to and resisting military abuse as well as in creating humanitarian space 
through various self-help strategies. For instance villagers hide rice stores at secret 
locations in the jungle and build concealed shelters in preparation for a possible flight 
from attacks by SPDC troops. Through advanced warning systems to relay messages 
between communities, villagers can gather their belongings and head into the forest 
before the soldiers arrive. Upon reaching the hiding sites the displaced communities 
re-establish schools and some measure of structure. IDPs also share rice with others 
who could not bring along sufficient reserves. They even grow small and durable 
crops if they expect to remain at the hiding site for a longer period. Temporary and 
covert ‘jungle markets’ allow displaced communities to trade with villagers living 
under military control. IDPs also actively seek out local aid groups that provide 
medical, educational and nutritional support (Phan and Hull, 2008: 18-19). Moreover 
they send out unarmed patrols to monitor military movements and exploit their 
connections to armed resistance forces for protection and information. If possible, 
IDPs reclaim their village sites whenever military units are absent (Malseed, 2009: 
377).  
Civilian Disaster Relief in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis 
The potential of civilian solidarity to create humanitarian space was particularly 
evident in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, when a wide variety of private relief 
activities were launched by civil society actors including not only self-help initiatives 
but also relief aid provided by diverse individuals and civil society groups from other 
parts of the country (Seekins, 2009: 732). Buddhist monks and ordinary citizens 
carried out most of the early recovery work, with little if any assistance from the 
government. Civil society aid providers were very diverse and although most of them 
came from Rangoon and other parts of Lower Burma, there were also volunteers from 
central Burma and even the border areas. They included business people, prominents, 
local employees of INGOs (e.g. Save the Childern, MSF, World Vision), charity 
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groups, medical workers, students and ordinary citizens. Buddhist monks were the 
most important aid providers as the authorities generally allowed them to bring 
supplies to the affected areas whereas aid goods from lay people were often 
confiscated by the military. Also, there is a network of Buddhist monasteries in the 
Irrawaddy Delta where victims could receive food and shelter. Christian churches in 
Rangoon were active in providing aid for their co-religionists in Delta Karen 
settlements (ibid. : 730-731). While most of the bigger aid agencies initially focused 
on the main population centres, many of these small and informal groups reached the 
most isolated areas. As the ICG reports: “Local people were not just victims, but 
active and resourceful participants in saving their own lives and those of their 
families, friends and neighbours” (ICG, 2008: 8).  
The SPDC, however, viewed these private aid activities as a danger to its own power 
monopoly and tried to control and curtail such efforts. In June it started to arrest local 
donors, of whom the most prominent was the comedian Zarganar, a popular regime 
dissident who had organised 400 volunteers to bring supplies to the remotest areas 
(Seekins, 2009: 731).  
Civil Society Organisations as Key Partners for International Aid Agencies 
With the arrival of UN assistance agencies and INGOs during the mid/late 1990s indigenous 
NGOs and civil society networks began to re-emerge (Clapp, 2007: 27). Soon they became 
key partners for international aid agencies for four reasons: firstly, they have better access to 
remote and sensitive areas. Several INGOs already cooperate with church organisations, 
which have access to otherwise inaccessible populations, e.g. IDPs in the border regions. 
Secondly, civil society partners help to ensure relevance and local ownership as well as the 
sustainability of aid projects. Thirdly, such an operational cooperation can be an integral part 
of local capacity-building and empowerment (ICG, 2008: 20). Fourthly, civil society actors 
can pass on human rights information to INGOs and contacts in Rangoon or Thailand. Such 
informal protection and advocacy activities can help to reduce the incidence of human rights 
abuses (South, 2008c: 18). However, there are limits to these kinds of partnerships as CSOs, 
particularly at the grass-roots level, often lack the planning, funds absorption and evaluation 
capacities necessary for larger programs. Also there is the risk of attracting negative 
government attention. Still, building up genuine partnerships with respect for local conditions 
and constraints is for sure a fruitful long-term commitment (ICG, 2004: 20).  
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5. Conclusion 
Burma can be classified as a complex emergency, which terms situations of chronic 
armed conflict and political instability, and consequently confronts aid providers with 
significant challenges. CEs involve not only physical suffering but also suffering 
caused by the dismantling of the social and cultural world that surrounds the victims. 
The OECD/DAC identified the following key characteristics of CEs: intra-state rather 
than inter-state conflict, difficulty in differentiating combatants and civilians, violence 
directed towards civilians and civil structures, fluidity of the situation on the ground, 
lack or absence of normal accountability mechanisms, the potential and actual 
development of war economies, the potential for humanitarian assistance to prolong 
the conflict and a multiplicity of actors; additionally CEs are frequently accompanied 
by public health threats, natural disasters (e.g. Cyclone Nargis in Burma), 
environmental issues, and socio-political processes (e.g. globalisation), and 
characterised by a lack of state capacity, legitimacy and accountability as well as by a 
gross imbalance in military expenditure, massive violations of humanitarian law and 
human rights, a high diversity and degree of violence, high numbers of refugees and 
IDPs and a longevity of the emergency situation; These characteristics form the basic 
conditions for the work of aid agencies in CEs such as Burma and have important 
implications for the quality and extent of humanitarian space.  
Rather than a charitable offering, humanitarian action is a rights-based activity 
according to international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. The 
humanitarian enterprise is a global responsibility. However, the disregard of 
combatants and the international community for much of the applicable international 
law can be identified as one of the key reasons for the difficulties faced in providing 
humanitarian aid and the resulting contraction of humanitarian space. Also, aid 
agencies have to rely on their reputation of acting in accordance with the fundamental 
humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality in 
order to be able to distribute humanitarian aid. If the warring parties regard 
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humanitarian operations as being of assistance to the enemy, the principles are 
abandoned, which can have serious affects on aid worker security and consequently 
on humanitarian space.  
I also addressed the multiplicity and diversity of players in the humanitarian field, 
which entails the challenge of coordination and cooperation. Smillie and Minear 
identified the following six sets of humanitarian actors: the United Nations 
institutions, donor governments and their various bilateral aid agencies, INGOs, the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, indigenous NGOs and civil society 
institutions, and newcomers (Muslim contributors, military and for-profit 
contractors); another increasingly important set of actors in intra-state conflicts are 
non-state armed groups (NSAGs), which in Burma play an indispensable role in the 
delivery of aid in ethnic minority areas and especially in cross-border assistance. 
Finally, the most important actor in any emergency is the affected population itself, 
who plays an important role in self-help initiatives and who should ideally participate 
in all phases of an aid project.  
Humanitarian aid in CEs is characterized by the competition of humanitarian actors 
for donors and hence for high visibility in the media. As a consequence humanitarian 
actors work in the midst of conflict, often while hostilities take place. This requires 
extensive and sometimes very complicated negotiations about access to the affected 
population. In many wars civilians are denied access to essential relief services, which 
can be accompanied by serious violence. As operations take place in the midst of 
conflict, the concept of humanitarian aid expanded to include not only emergency 
assistance but also protection of the civil population.  
CEs present aid workers with significant challenges and therefore require especially 
well-trained staff with a full understanding of the political, military, and economic 
dimensions of modern crisis as well as of the specific socio-cultural context. Above 
all humanitarian staff operates as diplomats in the field, which is a very heavy 
responsibility and burden. In Burma humanitarian diplomacy, a concept introduced by 
Minear and Smith (2007), is a key skill for maintaining and creating humanitarian 
space. As humanitarian organisations operate in increasingly hostile and militarized 
environments, staff faces physical and psychological strain as well as life-threatening 
risks in their work. Even though the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention obligates 
warring parties to grant medical personnel and by extension all aid workers full and 
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complete protection from interference or harm, this neutral status is increasingly put 
to the test in today’s conflicts (Sue et al., 2004: 2138). Schneider-Enk traces the 
lacking security of relief workers back to the characteristics of the new conflicts and 
of humanitarian aid and comes to the conclusion that for aid workers as well as the 
civil population hardly any protect zones are left. The humanitarian space, where aid 
agencies can operate freely and safely, is strongly constricted or even missing 
(Schneider-Enk, 2008: 71). 
It is important to take into account that the evaluation of humanitarian aid differs from 
conventional evaluation and has some distinct characteristics. The OECD for instance 
points out that the nature of CEs makes it specifically necessary to assess the 
humanitarian space, the security situation and the protection needs of the affected 
population (OECD, 1999b: 11). The OECD/DAC developed seven criteria for the 
evaluation of humanitarian aid in CEs: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, 
relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence and coverage. The humanitarian 
field, however, is still characterised by weak monitoring and evaluation. 
Thus humanitarian assistance in CEs faces numerous dilemmas, problems and 
challenges. The most important issue is the question whether the abuse of aid and its 
various negative side effects, including the potential for aid to prolong the conflict 
through providing subsistence to warring parties and by facilitating the elimination of 
state responsibilities for social welfare functions, outweigh its benefits. This resulted 
in an ongoing debate on whether and how to engage in Burma’s humanitarian crisis 
and confronts the international community with a political dilemma.  Another highly 
controversial issue concerns the question of whether humanitarian organizations can 
and should be neutral. Cross-border aid into Burma for example heavily relies on 
support and protection by armed resistance groups. However, otherwise this much-
needed assistance would not be possible. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that 
humanitarian organisations have to act in a ‘policy vacuum’, where aid policy 
increasingly becomes a substitute for foreign policy, especially in countries with little 
geo-economic significance (Bryer and Cairns, 1997: 370). The international response 
to Burma’s crisis for instance consists mainly of economic sanctions.  
The specific historical, political, social, economic and ethnic conditions in Burma as 
well as its strained foreign relations and severe human rights abuses, which I 
described in chapter 3, are prejudicial to humanitarian space and action.  
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Assistance to Burma takes on two forms according to its delivery channel: assistance 
‘via Rangoon’ (via state spaces), which is implemented by engaging the state to 
access the people, and ‘cross-border’ assistance (via non-state spaces, but sometimes 
partly controlled by opposition groups), which circumvents the state to access the 
people. Both forms of relief activity face the same major constraints: limited 
capacities and funding, plus government restrictions and the dangers of providing aid 
in areas of ongoing armed conflict (South, 2008b: 107).  
The important difference is, however, that aid agencies operating inside Burma via 
state spaces have to cooperate with the regime to a certain degree (MOUs), whereas 
cross-border aid operates in non-state spaces independently of the regime and is hence 
able to construct humanitarian space despite government restrictions by 
circumventing the state.  
The debate on engagement in Burma is reflected in the aid flows, which declined 
every time the military had cracked down hard on the population e.g. following the 
Saffron Revolution in 2007. The sources of international assistance to Burma are: UN 
agencies, the ILO, the ICRC, about 50 INGOs, donor governments and exile 
resources.  
In chapter 4 I explored the key challenge in the Burmese context, namely the 
difficulty of maintaining humanitarian space. In Burma the space for humanitarian 
action is being restricted due to increasing violence against humanitarian aid workers 
and increasingly hostile state regulations of the action of aid agencies (Addison, 2008: 
69), which clearly goes against international humanitarian principles. Three specific 
developments of the post-2004 political landscape are complicating the operational 
environment for aid organisations: a new leadership, which is more nationalistic, 
suspicious and disobliging; a subsequent government reorganisation; and a broader 
political transition in the course of the ‘Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy’. 
Government restrictions on programs and ongoing adjustments in the political and 
administrative system constrain the aid community’s ability to deliver assistance 
effectively, timely and responsibly (ICG, 2006: 5). These include: a set of new 
restrictive guidelines since 2006, bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays, restricted 
independence, restricted access to beneficiaries/travel limitations, forced closure of 
programs, financial constraints/corruption, limited opportunity for capacity-building, 
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excessive scrutiny by the authorities, and manipulation for public relations purposes 
by the regime; The impact of these government restrictions on aid agencies varies to a 
significant degree however. While some programs have been severely hindered or 
even closed, most agencies face fewer problems, some even expanding their 
activities. The following factors influencing the impact of restrictions can be 
identified: type of program, location, mode of operation, government counterparts and 
the level of trust; local NGOs are particularly vulnerable to regime pressure.  
Cyclone Nargis is certainly the most tragic example of the extent of the regime’s 
constraints on humanitarian space. Not only did the SPDC fail to warn or evacuate 
people, it also failed to launch a substantial relief operation of its own (ICG, 2008: 3). 
As if this was not enough, the military regime blocked international humanitarian 
assistance efforts during the crucial first weeks and when international aid finally 
began to trickle in, the SPDC insisted on strictly controlling the operation and limited 
access for international agencies and Burmese citizens wishing to help (South, 2008a: 
25). Additionally the regime is responsible for the misappropriation and other 
corruptive mishandling of foreign aid goods. The scope of action for aid agencies in 
the aftermath of the cyclone was also restricted due to limited funding.  
Yet, humanitarian space in Burma is not only restricted by the regime. Since 2004 
activism from the U.S. Congress and pro-democracy advocacy groups overseas trying 
to curtail foreign aid to Burma has revived and led to limited operational flexibility 
and funding as well as strained relations with Burmese authorities (ICG, 2006: 11), 
which was demonstrated by the Global Fund withdrawal in 2005.  
Accounts on humanitarian assistance to Burma, however, usually focus on its 
restrictive operating environment, without taking into account the various successful 
efforts of Burmese civil society in-country and cross-border to relief the suffering of 
their own people. Thus, despite government restrictions, it is also possible to carve 
out humanitarian space through direct response strategies to the regime’s repression. I 
demonstrated this by giving two examples. 
Firstly, the lack of access to vulnerable populations has led to the development of 
cross-border aid through networks of local staff, agents and partner organisations 
(Addison, 2008: 69). Especially the conflict zones of eastern Burma cannot be 
reached by NGOs working inside the country as they are prohibited by the regime, 
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which does not want aid flowing into the hands of ethnic and civil society groups, and 
also the areas are often inaccessible and too dangerous (Zaw, October 2009). Cross-
border aid, however, can additionally access communities hiding from SPDC patrols 
in more unstable and remote areas due to its local network. Although international 
agencies are involved in cross-border activities, they are mostly managed and 
implemented by local NGOs, ethnic nationalities’ departments and community-based 
groups in Thailand and Burma.  
The catastrophic humanitarian situation of the border areas, which are mainly 
populated by ethnic minorities - especially acute food insecurity and serious health 
threats - highlight the urgent and desperate need for this type of emergency relief. 
Here the socio-economic conditions and the humanitarian situation are in all aspects 
significantly worse than in central parts of the country. IDPs are the most vulnerable 
population group. Well over half a million people in eastern Burma are displaced, 
either living in government relocation sites or hiding from the army in the jungle and 
mountains under extremely harsh living conditions.  
I illustrated how Burmese civil society in exile implements these dangerous and 
incredibly courageous cross-border aid projects and the challenges met by a concrete 
case study, the Austrian non-profit association ‘Burmahilfe – Bildung für bedrohte 
Minderheiten’ (‚Burma-relief – education for threatened minorities’) and the project 
‘Karenni Mobile Clinics’, which is currently underway, implemented by the ‘Karenni 
Health Department’ (KnHD) with funds of ‘Caritas Austria’. The overall objective of 
the project is to improve the health situation of the IDP and rural population of 
Karenni State with no or limited access to health care through emergency relief and 
trainings aimed at providing knowledge about basic health care to enable the target 
group to deal with minor diseases on their own. With the help of this case study I 
demonstrated how state restrictions are circumvented and humanitarian space created, 
but also the dangers and problems involved: the hardships of such trips, which include 
not only the long and demanding journey itself but also great risks such as landmines, 
Burmese army troops, ‘free fire’ zones and malaria. Only Burmese refugees 
themselves can deal with these conditions, know the whereabouts of IDP 
communities and have the means and courage to deliver aid into these areas, not least 
because many have family members in the war zones. Additionally cross-border aid 
struggles to find funds due to its illegal nature and cooperation with armed resistance 
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groups as well as due to limited capacities, bureaucratic skills, monitoring and 
evaluation.  
Secondly, humanitarian space is created by civil society actors in Burma, where a 
quiet expansion of civil society is taking place at the local level (Dalpino, 2009: 3). 
Indigenous NGOs and community self-help organizations compensate for the lack of 
government programs and services (Clapp, 2007: 28). In fact, the failure of the 
country’s welfare state is the key factor enabling the existence and emergence of civil 
society spaces. However, civil society organisations have to keep up functional ties 
with members of the ruling establishment to a certain degree or even let themselves 
become partially co-opted by the latter, which gives them a double identity. Even 
though regime constraints remain considerable and do not allow for political 
expression or criticism, these CSOs and self-help initiatives successfully help to 
sustain basic welfare structures (Lorch, 2006: 30-31) and show that civilians are not 
mere victims of the military regime but rather political actors who address the basic 
needs of their communities. The state’s poor governance and coercive control as well 
as poverty have fostered, as a reaction, resilient ties of horizontal solidarity. Strong 
social networks and family ties provide mutual aid for collective survival (Seekins, 
2009: 728-729).  
In order to depict how Burmese civil society successfully creates humanitarian space 
under authoritarian rule, I mainly referred to Jasmin Lorch’s study “Civil Society 
under Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Myanmar” (2006). While it is often assumed 
that the strong military regime of Burma does not allow for any scope of action at all, 
Lorch argues that spaces for civil society actors do exist within three specific areas: 
“firstly, within the ambit of changes within the state itself; secondly, in various 
sectors of the weak welfare state; and thirdly, within some of the negotiated spaces of 
relative ethnic autonomy in ceasefire areas. While these rooms for manoeuvre are 
always relational to the authoritarian nature of the military regime, civil society actors 
use every space available in order to tackle the welfare needs of their respective 
communities” (2006: 5).  
Civil society emerging from within the state takes the form of welfare activities of 
government officials and emancipating segments of GONGOs.  
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The Burmese government is weak regarding the core function of providing for the 
welfare of the population, which is also part of a deliberate funding strategy of the 
regime. This entails gaps in the welfare system that are conducive to the emergence of 
civil society, whose actors are able to move into the emerging spaces and to take over 
central functions of the welfare state. The regime tolerates certain civil society 
activities where it is unable or unwilling to deal with the tremendous welfare needs 
itself. Consequently some room for manoeuvre exists for civil society actors in the 
welfare sector and takes the form of community-based organisations providing for 
humanitarian self-help and local infrastructure, Funeral Help Associations, parent-
teacher associations providing basic educational facilities, and finally the Sangha 
providing monastic education.  
Similarly some negotiated scope of action for civil society exists in certain ceasefire 
areas with a degree of ethnic autonomy. Even though most ceasefire agreements were 
motivated by mere economic interests of the military, they have led to the emergence 
or enlargement of humanitarian spaces for civil society such as informal development 
projects, culture and literature committees, and Christian churches providing 
education and development as well as the ‘Metta Development Foundation’ and the 
‘Shalom Foundation’.   
Also, I showed that civilian self-help initiatives ensure the survival of IDP 
communities, who have proven to be innovative and courageous in responding to and 
resisting military abuse as well as in creating humanitarian space.  
The potential of civilian solidarity to create humanitarian space was particularly 
evident in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, when a wide variety of private relief 
activities were launched by civil society actors including not only self-help initiatives 
but also relief aid provided by diverse individuals and civil society groups from other 
parts of the country (Seekins, 2009: 732). Buddhist monks and ordinary citizens 
carried out most of the early recovery work, with little if any assistance from the 
government. While most of the bigger aid agencies initially focused on the main 
population centres, many of these small and informal groups reached the most 
isolated areas. As the ICG reports: “Local people were not just victims, but active and 
resourceful participants in saving their own lives and those of their families, friends 
and neighbours” (ICG, 2008: 8). 
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Moreover, CSOs are key partners for the successful and sustainable work of 
international aid agencies.  
In conclusion it can be said that humanitarian space in Burma is restricted due to its 
general conditions, which are typical for CEs, especially the dangers of providing aid 
in a country with ongoing armed conflict and the increasing politicisation of aid by 
both donors and the Burmese government; in the specific Burmese context 
humanitarian space is also constricted due to government restrictions as well as 
activism from the U.S. Congress and pro-democracy advocacy groups overseas. In 
addition to these constraints, aid agencies struggle with limited funding due to donor 
concerns about a possible mishandling of aid and with a pervasive lack of capacity at 
all levels of state and society (ICG, 2008: 20-21). 
On the other hand humanitarian space is created through cross-border aid activities 
and the initiatives of Burmese civil society in-country. Furthermore some 
international aid agencies working inside Burma also succeed in creating a certain 
degree of humanitarian space at the local level through humanitarian diplomacy and 
with the help of benevolent government counterparts.  
Still, Burma is far from providing a  
“humanitarian space in which the spirit of humanitarian operations will 
be respected. Such a space entails the freedom to forge a relationship with 
the people we are there to help – to listen to their stories and discuss their 
predicament as the first step to really respecting their dignity. Without 
this connection, we reduce human beings to their biological state, defined 
and represented by what they lack to sty alive.” 
(Terry in: Malseed, 2009: 387)
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7. Annex 
Abstract 
The regime’s contested legitimacy and low international acceptance poses the 
question of how to tackle the country’s humanitarian problems without strengthening 
the current power holders to the international community. Confronted with numerous 
challenges typical for humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies, the aid 
community specifically struggles with the difficulty of creating and maintaining 
humanitarian space in Burma. Humanitarian space is, however, not only restricted 
through constraints by the regime fearing popular unrest and foreign influence, but 
also through activism of the U.S. Congress and pro-democracy groups overseas 
rejecting the provision of aid to Burma. Yet, accounts on humanitarian assistance to 
Burma usually focus on its restrictive operating environment, without taking into 
account the various successful efforts of Burmese civil society in-country and cross-
border to relieve the suffering of their own people despite government repression. 
One of these efforts takes the form of cross-border aid from neighbouring countries, 
supported by international aid agencies. Another example is the innovative self-help 
initiatives and community-based organisations of civil society actors in-country. 
Keywords: Burma, Myanmar, complex emergency, humanitarian aid, humanitarian 
space, cross-border aid, civil society, Karenni; 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die umstrittene Legitimität und das niedrige internationale Ansehen des burmesischen 
Regimes stellen die internationale Staatengemeinschaft vor die Frage, wie die 
humanitären Probleme des Landes bewältigt werden können, ohne die derzeitigen 
Machthaber zu bestärken. Konfrontiert mit zahlreichen Herausforderungen, welche 
humanitäre Hilfe in komplexen Katastrophen charakterisieren, kämpft die 
Hilfsgemeinschaft in Burma vor allem mit der Schwierigkeit, den sogenannten 
humanitären Raum zu schaffen bzw. aufrecht zu erhalten. Dieser wird allerdings nicht 
nur durch das Militärregime eingeschränkt, welches Volksunruhen und ausländischen 
Einfluss befürchtet, sondern auch durch Aktivismus des U.S. Kongresses und pro-
demokratischen Gruppen in Übersee, welche die humanitäre Hilfsleistungen an 
Burma ablehnen. Jedoch beschäftigen sich die meisten Berichte über humanitäre Hilfe 
in Burma hauptsächlich mit dem begrenzten operativen Umfeld. Dabei werden die 
zahlreichen erfolgreichen Bestrebungen der burmesischen Zivilgesellschaft im Inland 
sowie im Exil die Not ihrer Mitmenschen trotz der Unterdrückung seitens der 
Regierung zu lindern, meist nicht in die Betrachtung mit einbezogen. Eine dieser 
Bestrebungen findet in Form von illegaler, grenzüberschreitender Hilfe von 
burmesischen Flüchtlingen in Nachbarländern, unterstützt von diversen 
internationalen Hilfsorganisationen, statt. Ein weiteres Beispiel sind die innovativen 
Selbsthilfe-Initiativen und kommunalen Organisationen von zivilgesellschaftlichen 
Akteuren im Land selbst.  
Keywords: Burma, Myanmar, complex emergency, humanitarian aid, humanitarian 
space, cross-border aid, civil society, Karenni;  
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